(1.) THIS second appeal is directed against the order dated 30th June, 1995 passed by the District Judge, Purnia in Title Appeal No. 35 of 1993, whereby and whereunder the lower appellate Court has not found any justified reason to condone the abnormal delay of over three years and consequently declined to admit the appeal because it is hopelessly time barred by over three years.
(2.) LEARNED Counsel for the respondents has raised a preliminary objection as regards the maintainability of this second appeal against the impugned order as, according to him, there has been no adjudication on merit of the appeal determining the rights of the parties to the matters in controversy and, as such, it is not a decree against which the second appeal lies under Section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure. In support of this, learned Counsel for the respondents has placed reliance on a decision of the Apex Court in the case of Ratansing v. Vijaysing AIR 2001 S.C. 279.
(3.) IN the case of Mela Ram & Sons v. I.T. Commr, (Supra) also the Supreme Court was dealing with the question as to whether against such an order, appeal under special statute can be preferred not similar to the one as provided in Section 100 of the C.P.C. Section 100 of the C.P.C. clearly provides that "Save as otherwise expressly provided in the body of this Code or by any other law for the time being in force, an appeal shall lie to the High Court from every decree (underlining is mine) passed in appeal by any Court subordinate to the High Court, if the High Court is satisfied that the case involves a substantial question of law. Sub-section (2) also provides that an appeal may lie under this section from an appellate decree (underlining is mine) passed ex parte.