MAHABIR PRASAD SARAOGI Vs. BIBHUTI MOHAN BHATTACHARJEE

JUDGEMENT

(1.) THIS second appeal by the plaintiffs arises out of a suit for eviction from a house situate in the town of Dehri-on-Sone and for arrears of rent. Eviction was claimed on all the possible grounds available, namely, personal necessity, default In payment of rent for the months of October and November, 1962, expiry of the term of the lease and also breach of the conditions of the tenancy. The defendants-respondents denied all the allegations. According to them, there was no personal necessity, there was no default in payment, of the rents for the months of October and November, 1962 which, were remitted by postal money order, there was no breach, of any of the conditions of the tenancy end the tenancy not being for a fixed term there was 'no question of expiry of the lease. The suit has been decreed so far as arrears of rent are concerned, but has been dismissed in respect of the claim for eviction. On all the questions relating to eviction both the Courts below have concurrently found against the appellants.

(2.) MR. Rameshwar Prasad, learned counsel for the appellants has submitted that the findings of the Courts below on the questions of personal necessity, default and breach of condition of the tenancy were wrong. The personal necessity alleged and pressed in the Courts below was that the appellants required at least a portion of the land on which, the house was situated for constructing another house on the vacant land behind the house which is the subject-matter of the dispute in the present suit. Such a necessity cannot be a ground for eviction under the Bihar Buildings (Lease, Rent and Eviction) Control Act (hereafter referred to as 'the Act'). Section 11 of the Act lays down the grounds on which a tenant can be evicted. He cannot be evicted on grounds not mentioned in that section. The ground commonly known as personal necessity is stated in Clause (c) of Sub-section (1) of Section 11 which reads as follows:--

(3.) THE main point urged by learned counsel for the appellants which, it appears, led to reference of this case to the Division Bench, is on the question of default Clause (d) of Section 11 (1) of the Act provides that where the amount of two months' rent lawfully payable by the tenant and due from him is in arrears by not having been paid within the time fixed by contract, or in the absence of such contract, by the last day of the month next following that for which the rent is payable or by not having been validly remitted or deposited in accordance with Section 13, the landlord will be entitled to get the tenant evicted. Section 13 (1) of the Act runs as follows: