JAGARNATH PRASAD Vs. STATE OF BIHAR

JUDGEMENT

(1.) These two petitions under Article 226 or the Constitution of India, and Section 491 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, have been heard together as they raise common questions of law. This judgment will govern both the applications. The facts out of which the two applications arise are similar but not the same, and it will be necessary to state separately the facts of two cases.

(2.) One of the applications is on behalf of Jagerpath Prasad thereinafter called the first petitioner), who is stated to be a shop-keeper at Chapra dealing in cloth. On or about the 4th of October, 1950, his shop was searched, and certain books, such as the stock register, cash book etc.. were taken away by the Magistrate who searched the shop. It was stated that the first petitioner was then absent from Chapra. When he returned, he came to know that a report had been made against him for his prosecution under Section 7 of the Essential Supplies (Temporary Powers) Act, 1946. On the 13th or 14th of November, 1950, the first petitioner made a representation. On the 28th of November, 1950, when the first petitioner was ill at Banaras, a second representation was made on his behalf to the District Magistrate of Saran. On this representation, it is stated, the District Magistrate asked for a report from the Sub-divisional Magistrate, who, in his turn, called for a report from Mr. Ekka, the Magistrate who searched the shop of the petitioner. On the 4th of November, 1950, however, an order of detention had been made by the State Government against the first petitioner in exercise of the powers conferred on it by Sub-clause (iii) of Clause (a) of Sub-section (1) of Section 3 of the Preventive Detention Act, 1950 (Act IV of 1950). This order of detention stated that "the State Government was satisfied that with a view to preventing Shri Jagarnath Prasad from acting in any manner prejudicial to the maintenance of supplies and services essential to the community", it was necessary to arrest and detain him in the jail at Chapra. It is to be noted that when the order of detention was passed, the first petitioner was not in custody. It is stated on his behalf that on being informed of the order of detention, he surrendered on the 30th May, 1951. The order of detention, was served on the first petitioner on that date in Chapra Jail, and on the 8th of June, 1951, the grounds of detention dated the 5th of June, 1951, were communicated to the first petitioner. It is stated that on the 10th June, 1951, the first petitioner made a representation to the Secretary, Supply and Price Control Department. From an affidavit filed on behalf of the State of Bihar, it appears that the first petitioner made a representation against theorder of detention which was considered by the Advisory Board, and on the 21st July, 1951, the Board reported that in its opinion there was sufficient cause for the detention of the first petitioner.

(3.) The grounds of detention communicated to the first petitioner, gave a statement of certain facts in the first four paragraphs namely, (a) that Sri Jagarnath Prasad held a licence for a wholesale dealer in cloth under paragraph 3 of the Bihar Cotton Cloth and Yarn (Control) Order, 1948; (b) that in his capacity as a licensee, he received for sale to the public a supply of cloth from one of the cloth importers in Bihar; (c) that one of the conditions of the licence was that he should maintain a register of daily transactions showing correctly the opening balance, receipt, sale, and closing balance of all cloth received by him; and (d) that during the months of September and October 1950 (before the approaching festivals of Dasahara and Muharram), an artificial scarcity in cloth was caused in Bihar by the cloth dealers indulging in certain activities such as hoarding, withholding from sale popular variety of cloth or selling them at exorbitant prices), to check which the State Government directed simultaneous raids of cloth shops in all districts. After stating these facts, the grounds of detention proceeded to give particular facts relating to the first petitioner. These read as follows: