LAWS(PAT)-1951-9-10

BIBI WAZIUDDINNISSA Vs. JANAK SINGH

Decided On September 12, 1951
MT. BIBI WAZIUDDINNISSA Appellant
V/S
JANAK SINGH Respondents

JUDGEMENT

(1.) THE question that is sought to be raised in this second appeal is not a question of law, nor strictly speaking, can it, I think myself, be said to be even a mixed question of law and fact. On the 20th of May 1943, a Nazarat peon went to village Keora with a notice under Section 7 of the Public Demands Recovery Act addressed to one of the plaintiffs. He went to the house of this plaintiff, and, eventually, hung the notice up on the wall of an 'osara' in the house. It is contended by Mr. B. N. Mitra for the appellants that before hanging the notice up, the peon had not used "all due and reasonable diligence" to find the plaintiff. Now, it is conceded that the plaintiff, to whom the notice was addressed, was in her house when the peon went there. It is also conceded that at her house at the time there was one Radhe, who was her 'gorait.' This Radhe did not admit that the notice was sent into the house to the plaintiff, and that she refused to accept it and returned it. On the other hand, he did not say either that this had not been done. Mr. B. N. Mitra for the appellants has referred us to the observations of Sif Comer Petheram, C. J., quoted in 'Kassim Ebrahim v. Johurmull Khemka', 23 Cal L J 183 at p. 187. In that case, however, as in the cases cited by the learned Subordinate Judge, the person for whom the summons or notice was intended was not at his house when the peon went to it, and the peon had not gone to look for him or waited, a sufficient time for him to return. THEre was no reason why the peon should have sat down at the plaintiff's house and waited until she came out of it. She was not likely to come out, and if she had, as she was a 'pardanashin' woman, the peon would, in any case, have been unable to tender the notice to her. THE learned Additional District Judge was, in my opinion, correct in drawing the inference which he did. THE question is really a question of fact, and as there was evidence in which the learned Additional District Judge could decide the point in the way he did, there is no merit in the appeal, which must be dismissed with costs.