DAYANAND MODI Vs. STATE OF BIHAR

JUDGEMENT

(1.) Since the latter part of November 1950, we heard, with occasional breaks, a large-number of habeas corpus appls. in which common questions of law & fact arose for our consideration & decision. We reserved judgment-in these cases to enable learned counsel, arguing the different applns. to make all their submissions before we pronounced judgment. "We are now proceeding to judgment in these cases. in batches. The first batch of cases, which will-be governed by this judgment, consists of six. applns. the numbers of which have been mentioned in the first two pages of this judgment.

(2.) All the applns relate to, & are on behalf of, certain persons who have been detained by-an order of the State Govt. under Section 3, Preventive Detention Act, 1930 (to be referred to-hereinafter as the Detention Act). The State Govt. states, in the orders of detention, that; it is satisfied that it is necessary to make the-orders, with a view to preventing the detenus from acting in any manner prejudicial to "the-maintenance of supplies & services essential to the community"; in other words, the orders purport to have been made under Section 3 (I) (a) (iii), of the Detention Act. In the grounds communicated to the detenus, the expression used, in some of the cases, is that "the State Government is satisfied that if the detenu is allowed to remain at large, he will indulge in activities-prejudicial to the maintenance of "supplies essential to the community", the expression-"and services" having been dropped. I am mentioning this fact at this stage, as one of the main contentions of learned counsel for the petnrs. relates to this matter. It would, I think, be convenient if we first consider in-these cases the questions of law that have been raised, & then go into the grounds of detention, in detail, of each detenu. The questions of law-are common to all the applns. but the grounds, communicated though similar in nature, vary from case to case & would require a separate treatment in each case.

(3.) The principal contention of law, which is common to all these applns. & has been very strenuously canvassed at the bar, may be thus put in nutshell; it is contended that the activities on the basis of which the orders of detention have been made (which activities are loosely & commonly called "blackmarketing" or "hoarding" in food or cloth) do not attract the Soperation of el. (iii) of Sub-section 1 (a) of Section 3 of the Detention Act. To understand this contention, it is necessary to give some more details. The relevant portion (omitting unnecessary details) of Section 3 of the Detention Act reads thus: