TEEPAN PRASAD SINGH Vs. STATE OF BIHAR

JUDGEMENT

(1.) Petitioner has filed this writ application for quashing of a memo dated 1.3.2004, issued under the signature of Engineer-in-Chief, Road Construction Department, by which a proceeding against the petitioner under Rule 43(b) of the Bihar Pension Rule was initiated and also for quashing of another memo dated 22.4.2010, issued under the signature of Secretary, Department of Road Construction, wherein, it has been held that, during the pendency of the proceeding, petitioner was not entitled for monetary benefits of Junior and Senior Selection Grades and has also prayed for a direction to the respondents not to proceed with the proceeding.

(2.) Learned counsel for the petitioner has raised the question of limitation in initiation of proceeding in view of proviso (a)(ii) of Rule 43(b) of the Bihar Pension Rules. The submission of learned counsel for the petitioner is that the charges relate to the period up to 1995, whereas the petitioner superannuated on 28.2.2003. Hence, as the period of misconduct was prior to four years from the date of superannuation, the proceeding could not be initiated against him.

(3.) Mr. Verma appearing for the respondents, referring to the counter affidavit, has pointed out that an explanation was called for from the petitioner by letter dated 28.2.2002 itself, when he was in service. He did not respond to it. Hence, a fresh show cause notice was also issued. Then only he filed his explanation on 15.1.2003 and soon thereafter he superannuated. Hence a proceeding was initiated against him on 1.3.2004 under Rule 43(b) of the Bihar Pension Rule to which he did file his reply. He submits that thereafter petitioner moved this Court for payment of his retiral dues and payment in respect of his some pre-retiral entitlements through CWJC No. 10662 of 2007. He submits that at that time petitioner was well aware that the proceeding had been initiated and pending against him. Still he did not choose to make a prayer in the writ application for quashing of the proceeding, although the fact with regard to the proceeding was mentioned in the writ application and memo of charge was also annexed. Hence, a presumption can be drawn that the petitioner gave up his claim to challenge the legality of initiation of the proceeding at that stage and raised his grievance before this Court only in respect of payment of his retiral dues and in respect of his pre-retiral entitlements. In the circumstances, he submits that the present writ application with a prayer to quash the initiation of departmental proceeding is hit by principle of estoppel and, therefore, the same cannot be entertained now.