(1.) This Letters Patent Appeal is directed against the judgment dated the 27th January, 1989, passed by a learned single judge of this Court in C.W.J.C. No. 1542 of 1986(R).
(2.) The material facts giving rise to this appeal, briefly, are as follows :- Respondent No. 2 was employed as an auto-electrician by the appellant. In a domestic enquiry held against respondent No. 2 for misconduct he was found guilty of the charges levelled against him and was, accordingly, dismissed from service. Aggrieved by the order of dismissal, respondent No. 2 raised an industrial dispute, which was referred by the State of Bihar to the Presiding Officer, Labour Court, Ranchi, for adjudication under Section 10 of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, (hereinafter referred to as 'the Act'). In the written statement filed by respondent No. 2 before the Labour Court he averred that the enquiry officer was prejudiced against him and that the enquiry was not fair and proper, inasmuch as after the management and respondent No. 2 had adduced evidence and closed their case, the management was permitted to examine one more witness without giving an opportunity to respondent No. 2 to rebut that evidence. It was also averred that on account of certain incidents referred to in the written statement, the officers of the appellant were extremely prejudiced against respondent No. 2 and that the order of dismissal was the result of victimisation. In the written statement filed on behalf of the appellant it was prayed that the Labour Court be pleased to decide first the question of propriety of the domestic enquiry and that if it was held that the enquiry was not proper, the appellant would adduce evidence in support of the action taken against respondent No. 2. The Labour Court thereafter proceeded to decide the question of validity of the domestic enquiry as a preliminary issue. The Labour Court found, on the basis of the material produced before it, that after the management had adduced evidence and closed its case and after the evidence of the workman was recorded the enquiry officer permitted the management to adduce further evidence and that instead of giving opportunity to the workman to lead evidence in rebuttal, he was allowed to be cross-examined by the management. It was also found that the enquiry officer had made spot inspection without informing the workman about it. In view of these findings, the Labour Court held that the enquiry was violative of the principle of natural justice and was, therefore, invalid. Aggrieved by this order passed by the Labour Court, the appellant filed a petition before this Court under Article 226/227 of the Constitution of India. That was registered as C.W.J.C.No. 333 of 1984(R). A learned single judge of this Court allowed that petition holding that the reasons given by the Labour Court for setting aside the domestic enquiry were unsustainable in view of the fact that respondent No. 2 had stated before the enquiry officer that he was given all opportunity to defend-his case and that the enquiry officer, even if he had made local inspection, behind the back of respondent No. 2, had not relied upon the report of that inspection, while arriving at his finding. The learned single judge, therefore, quashed the order passed by the Labour Court. When the matter went back to the Labour Court, respondent No. 2 submitted an application before the Labour Court that he be allowed to adduce evidence to show that the action of the management was mala fide and that he was victimised as he had refused to attend, to the private work of officers of the appellant. This application was resisted by the appellant on the ground that the Labour Court had no jurisdiction to permit the workman to adduce any evidence in view of the proviso to Section 11-A of the Act. The Labour Court, however, held by its order dated the 5th September, 1986, that the workman was not debarred from adducing evidence to prove victimisation, unfair labour practice or mala fides on the part of the management. Aggrieved by that order, the appellant filed a petition before this Court under Article 226/227 of the Constitution. That petition was dismissed by a learned single judge of this Court by a very well considered judgment. Aggrieved by that judgment, the appellant has filed this Letters Patent Appeal. When this appeal came up for hearing before a Division Bench of this Court, the correctness of a Division Bench decision of this Court in Bihar State Road Transport Corporation, Patna, v. State of Bihar and Ors. (C.W.J.C.No. 58 of 1982(R) disposed of on the 4th December, 1984), on which reliance was placed by the learned single judge, was doubted. A Full Bench was, therefore, constituted to hear this appeal. That is how this matter has come up before us for consideration.
(3.) Dr. Devi Pal, learned counsel for the appellant, contended that in view of the proviso to Section 11-A of the Act the Labour Court had no jurisdiction to take any fresh evidence in relation to the dispute referred to it under Section 10 of the Act, and the learned single Judge, therefore, erred in holding that the proviso to Section 11-A of the Act did not have the effect of curtailing the jurisdiction which a Labour Court possessed prior to the insertion of Section 11-A in the Act, to decide whether the management was guilty of unfair labour practice, mala fide or victimisation. It was further contended that in any event the workman having failed to adduce any evidence regarding bias or victimisation when the preliminary issue was fixed for hearing by the Labour Court, he could not thereafter be allowed to adduce any evidence in that behalf. In reply, it was contended by Shri Mitter, learned counsel for respondent No. 2, that in view of the decision of the Supreme Court in the Workmen of Firestone Tyre & Rubber Co, of India P.Ltd, v. The Mangement and Ors. (1973-I-LLJ-278) the learned single judge was right in upholding the order passed by the Labour Court.