JUTE MILLS STAFF ASSOCIATION Vs. STATE OF BIHAR

JUDGEMENT

(1.) Petitioners herein allege that the respondents have committed error of law in refusing to make a reference of the industrial dispute with respect to the dismissal of the petitioner No. 2 by the management of National Jute Manufactures Corporation Unit R. B. H. M., which is represented before us through its Executive Director. Facts which do not appear in dispute are that the petitioner was appointed by the management of R.B.H M. Jute Mills Pvt. Ltd. which was a private Limited company operating at Katihar. The said management was taken over by the Central Government under the Industries Development and Regulation Act, 1951, and thereafter under the Jute Companies (Nationalisation) Act, 1980. A notification was issued under Section 6 of the said Act according to which the undertaking previously under the Private Limited Companies Management became the unit of the National Jute Manufactures Corporation, respondent No. 3 Petitioners have alleged that under Section 12 of the Nationalisation Act like other employees who were immediately before the appointed date employed in the undertaking became employees of the Central Government and thereafter when the management vested in the National Jute Manufactures Corporation, employees of the Corporation. Petitioners have alleged that petitioner No. 2 was in the service of the erstwhile management on the due date i.e. 21-12-1980. He however, was served with an officer order dated 18-4-1981 stating that he was dismissed from service w. e. f. 23-5-1980. According to the petitioners, the said order of dismissal was bad in law for several reasons. Petitioners accordingly demanded a conciliation and when the conciliation failed a reference under Section 10 of the Industrial Disputes Act. Petitioners have alleged that on some allegations petitioner No. 2 was subjected to a criminal prosecution for offences punishable under Sections 465, 468, 467 and 477-A of the Indian Penal Code but was acquitted. Notwithstanding the said acquittal, however he was subjected to a proceeding and notwithstanding his objection as to the validity of the said proceeding he was orderd to be dismissed from the service as aforementioned. The order refusing to reference, however, states that since the petitioner was dismissed from service with effect from 23-5-1980 on which date he was employed under the erstwhile management of the Jute Mills, he was not an employee of the management of National Jute Manufactures Corporation on the due date, and, therefore, not an employee who could raise a dispute with the respondent No. 3, namely, National Jute Manufactures Corporation. The order is patently bad in law. The management of the respondent No. 3 although designed the order to remove the petitioner No 2 from service with effect from 23-5-1980 could not give effect to the said order from a date prior to the issuance thereof that is to say 18-4-1981. Even this whether the petitioner could be dismissed by the respondent No. 3 with effect from a date when respondent No. 3 had no control upon the management of the mill and also as to whether there could be any retrospective removal/dismissal from the service or not is a question that may in a given case be an industrial dispute. In the instant case, however, since this fact is not in dispute that the order dismissing the petitioner was issued by the Chairman of the Management Board of the respondent No. 3 on 18-4-1981 the only possible conclusion is that the dismissal order became effective on and from 18-4-1981. That being the position in law petitioner No. 2 evidently was an employee of the respondent No 3 on 18-4-1981 that is to say a date after the due date of take over that is to say 21-12-1980.

(2.) Facts aforementioned leave no doubt that the question as to whether petitioner No. 2 was wrongfully dismissed by the respondent No. 3 or not, is an industrial dispute.

(3.) State Government's jurisdiction under Section 10 of the Industrial Disputes Act to make a reference of the industrial dispute is confined to the satisfaction as to whether any industrial dispute existed or not or is apprehended or not. It has no jurisdiction to from its own opinion about the correctness or otherwise of the allegations made by either party to the dispute. It can not come to its own conclusion on the merits of the dispute. It, however, can determine the issues which emerge from the facts placed before it but can not record any finding to say that although a dispute has been raised and parties are at issue with respect to certain allegations of fact, yet it is not satisfied that an industrial dispute is in existence or is in offing. It shall be, in such a situation, obliged to make a reference. The Supreme Court in The M. P. Irrigation Karmachari Sangh v. State of M. P. and another, 1985 LAB IC 932, has said ; "There may be exceptional cases in which the State Govern meat may, on a proper examination of the demand, come to conclusion that the demands are either perverse or frivolous and do not merit a reference. Government should be very slow to attempt an examination of the demand with a view to decline reference and courts will always be vigilant whenever the Government attempts to usurp the powers of the Tribunal lor adjudication of valid disputes. To allow the Government to do so would be to render Section 10 and Section 12(5) of the Industrial Disputes Act nugatory." The above observations have been made by the Supreme Court after considering the view expressed by the Supreme Court itself in one of its earlier judgment in Bombay Union of Journalists v. State of Bombay, AIR 1964 SC 1617. In that case it was observed :