RAMAUTAR PRASAD Vs. STATE OF BIHAR

JUDGEMENT

(1.) This application in revision by the plaintiffs in a pending suit is directed against the decision of the lower appellate court rejecting their prayer for temporary injunction restraining the State of Bihar from realising the additional duty on the stock of liquor on the 1st November 1967 and from taking any step against the plaintiffs in that direction.

(2.) According to the plaintiffs' case, a notification had been issued in 1967 for realisation of the aforesaid additional duty and was challenged success fully in the Supreme Court. The decision of the Supreme Court is reported in AIR 1970 Supreme Court 1971. The defendants, thereafter, have amend ed the Excise Act itself to the same effect which according to the plaintiffs' must be held to be ultra vires. The courts have concurrently held that the plaintiffs have not made out a prima facie case. In support of this finding, lear ned Government Pleader no. 2 has contended that the amendment of the Act is good in regard to such stocks which were in possession of the liquor dealers after 1968 notification. Without deciding this point, but assuming that the learned Government Pleader is right, a question of fact will have to be enquired into as to whether the liquor on which additional duty is being demanded from these plaintiffs were in stock on the relevant date or not. The question of facts being dependent on evidence, it is not possible to say that the plaintiffs do not have a prima facie case for a trial.

(3.) Mr. S. C. Ghose appearing for the petitioners has urged that the plaintiffs have long sold all the liquor on which they are now being asked to pay additional duty, and if the dema'nd had been made earolier, they could have realised this from the retail purchasers. Now, if by a subsequent legislation the plaintiffs are made to pay the demanded amount, the demand is bound to seriously hurt them, as they are commercial people and depend upon the payments they receive from their customers. The principle on which the Supreme Court decision was given itself, according to the learned counsel, strongly supports the view that the balance of convenience must be assumed to be in favour of the plaintiffs in the present injunction matter and it should further be held that they are likely to suffer irreparable injuries if injunction is refused. The arguments appear to be well founded.