MOHANLAL SAH Vs. SABITRI DEVI PODDAR

JUDGEMENT

(1.) The defendant is the appellant in this second appeal. The plaintiff had instituted the suit in question for eviction of the defendant from the premises fully described in Schedules 1 and 2 of the plaint.

(2.) It appears that the defendant was a tenant of the suit premises at a monthly rental of Rs. 16/- for the portion described in Schedule 1 and Rs. 3/- for the portion described in Schedule 2. The plain-tiff purchased the house along with the aforesaid portions under a registered sale deed dated 1-12-1960. A notice under Section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act was given by the plaintiff to the defendant on 31-1-1961. Ultimately, the suit in question was filed on 18-4-1963, The eviction was sought for, on the ground of default in payment of rent as well as on the ground of personal necessity. The defendant contested the suit, and, according to him, neither there has been any default in the payment of rent nor there was any personal necessity on the part of the plaintiff.

(3.) At the trial however, it was an admitted position that the defendant had been sending the rent of the premises in question by postal money order before the institution of the suit in purported compliance of the requirement of Section 13 of the Bihar Buildings (Lease, Rent and Eviction) Control Act, 1947 (hereinafter to be referred to as 'the Act'). It was also admitted that instead of sending Rs. 19/-for each month, which was admittedly the rent in respect of the premises in question, the defendant was remitting a lesser amount after deducting the postal money order commission. The trial court, on a consideration of the materials, came to the conclusion that the plaintiff has failed to prove personal necessity, one of the grounds urged on her behalf for the purpose of eviction of the defendant. However, the learned Subordinate Judge held that having not remitted the rent at the rate of Rs. 19/- each month, there was no valid tender, and, as such, the defendant was a defaulter within the meaning of Section 11 (1) (d) of the Act, and, therefore, liable for eviction. The appeal filed on behalf of the defendant against the aforesaid finding was dismissed by the learned District Judge, who affirmed both the findings of the trial court.