BISHESHWAR PD MANDAL Vs. RAJBATI DEVI

JUDGEMENT

(1.) The tenant defendant has filed this application against the order of the trial Court striking out his defence against his ejectment in an action brought by the plaintiff opposite party for his eviction from the suit premises.

(2.) Earlier an order under Section 11-A of the Bihar Buildings (Lease, Rent and Eviction) Control Act, 1947 (hereinafter called the old Act) was passed on 15th of March, 1978 against the defendant but as there appeared to be some confusion in that order in the sense that it was not drawn in terms of Section 11A and when a petition for striking out the defence was filed for non-compliance with the said order, the Court below passed a fresh order on 6-8-1979 in terms of the section. Both the parties are at one that this was a fresh order under Section 13 of the Bihar Buildings (Lease, Rent and Eviction) Control Act, 1977 (hereinafter called the new Act) which corresponds to Section 11A of the old Act. The petitioner, however, deposited the rents for 2 months, namely June, 'and July, 1979 on 23rd Aug., 1979 purporting to be within 15 days from 16-8-1979 when the order under Section 13 was shown to the lawyer as directed in the order dated 6-8-1979 itself. The plaintiff accordingly filed another petition on 10-9-1979 for striking out the petitioner's defence against his ejectments as the deposit on 23-8-1979 was not in accordance with the terms of the order being beyond 15 days therefrom. The petitioner, however, pleaded in defence that the order aforesaid did not become operative until it was shown to his lawyer and, therefore, the deposit on 23-8-1979 was well within time from the date when the order was shown to his lawyer on 16-8-1979. The trial Court has rejected this plea of the petitioner on the ground that the order under Section 13 of the new Act became operative from the date of the order itself according to the provisions contained therein, and inasmuch as there is no jurisdiction in the court to extend the said period of 15 days, the deposit was not in compliance with the said order and has, accordingly, passed the order striking off his defence.

(3.) Mr. Madan Mohan No. I appearing in support of this application pressed the same point which was raised on behalf of the petitioner in the court below. His argument was that unless the order dated 6-8-1979 was passed immediately on hearing the parties, the time limit of 15 days for making the deposit would not start operating unless the petitioner was either informed, as in the present case, or until he derived the knowledge on the next date when the matter was posted. It is difficult to accept this contention as in that view the limitation put under Section 13, i. e., within 15 days "of the date of the order" would become redundant. There might be some force in this argument had the order been reserved on 6-8-1979 and would have been passed by the trial Court sometime between this date and the next date, but, undisputedly, the order was passed on that very day, i.e., 6-8-1979 itself. It is the usual practice and the direction of this Court that at the close of office business a cause list is hung on the notice board of the subordinate Courts indicating the orders passed by Courts on the matters before them and the matters in which orders are passed after hearing the par- ties; even it the order is passed in Chamber, the fact is indicated in the cause list. A copy of the cause list is also forwarded to the Bar Association. In that view of the matter, the petitioner can't make any grievance of want of any knowledge of the order until it was shown to his laywer later on. The direction for informing the petitioner's lawyer in the said order was a matter of mere indulgence and no capital can be made out by him out of that order or direction. The duty of the petitioner was to ascertain the order, particularly, on the facts of the present case when he had been already aware that a fresh order against him was going to be passed as the earlier order passed on 15-3-1978 was not very clear. Therefore, there was no occasion for any impression that the plaintiff's petition for an order against him had even a remote chance of being rejected.