BURRA KUR COAL CO LTD Vs. AZIMUDDIN ASHRAFF

JUDGEMENT

(1.) This is an application by Burra Kur Coal Co., Ltd. having its registered office at Dhanbad, for an appropriate writ under Article 226 of the Constitution for quashing the order of the Chairman, Industrial Tribunal, Dhanbad (opposite party No. 2), dated 28th March, 1958. Azimuddin Ashraff (opposite party No. 1) was employed by the petitioner as Register-keeper of the colliery, and his services were terminated with effect from 26th April, 1957 by a letter which is in the following terms:

(2.) The validity or otherwise of the award depends upon the true and correct connotation ot the word "retrenchment", and the important question, therefore, that falls for determination is whether the termination of the service of Opposite Party No. 1 in this case amounts to retrenchment. Section 2(00) of the Act defines retrenchment as follows:

(3.) A similar view has been expressed by the Supreme Court also in Pipraich Sugar Mills Ltd. v. Pipraich Sugar Mills Mazdoor Union, (S) AIR 1957 SC 95. Therein, it has been laid down that retrenchment connotes in its ordinary acceptation that the business itself is being continued but that a portion of the staff or the labour force is discharged as surplusage. Following the aforesaid decisions of the Supreme Court, a Bench of the Bombay High Court in Municipal Corporation of Greater Bombay v. Labour Appellate Tribunal of India, (S) AIR 1957 Bom 188 has laid down that the expression "retrenchment" in Section 2(00) and Section 25F of the Act means discharge of surplus labour or staff and does not mean termination of the contract of employment for other causes. It is manifest, therefore, that the termination of the service of workmen, though not falling under Clause (a), (b) or (c) of section 2(00), not being a punishment inflicted by way oE disciplinary action, is still not retrenchment within the meaning of that section, unless the termination of service was on account of surplus labour or staff. Having regard to the test laid down by the Supreme Court, it must be held that the termination of service of opposite party No. 1 cannot be regarded as retrenchment, and the Chairman of the Industrial Tribunal was, therefore, wrong in treating the case of opposite party No. 1 as a case ot retrenchment. On this ground alone, the award of the Industrial Tribunal is patently illegal and without jurisdiction and cannot be sustained.