JOHRI MULL PRAHLAD RAI Vs. HIRA LAL SETH

JUDGEMENT

(1.) In this case the defendant has obtained a rule from the High Court against the order of the Munsif of Hazaribagh, dated 10-2-1958, holding that he has jurisdiction to try the suit brought by the plaintiff for recovery of a sum ot Rs. 1904/- and odd due to be paid by the defendant after accounts had been taken.

(2.) It appears that the plaintiff was a cloth dealer of Chatra in Hazaribagh district, carrying on the business under the name and style of Laxmi Narain Hiralal. The plaintiff was holding an "A" class cloth licence issued by the State Government for the import of cloth from Bombay, Ahmadabad and other places after the Controller had made the necessary allotment of quota. The licence taken by the plaintiff was for the supply and distribution of cloth within the Chatra Sub-division of Hazaribagh district. It appears that the defendant booked consignments of cloth to the plaintiff, and since Gava was the nearest railway station from Chatra the plaintiff agreed to take the consignments at the Gaya railway station and the price of the goods was also paid by the plaintiff through a bank at Gaya. The case of the plaintiff is that for the period from Baisakh Badi 9 Sambat 2008 to Chait Badi 4 Sambat 2009 the defendant had overcharged the plaintiff and realised an excess sum of Rs. 2819/-and odd more than the value of the goods sent by the defendant to the plaintiff. The plaintiff, therefore, brought the present suit for realising the amount of Rs. 1904/- and odd which was due from the defendant to the plaintiff after accounts had been taken between the parties. The defendant raised a preliminary objection with regard to the jurisdiction of the court. It was contended on his behalf that the Munsif of Hazaribagh hud no jurisdiction to hear the suit because no part of the cause of action arose at Chatra. The objection was overruled by the Munsif and the defendant has obtained a rule from the High Court against this Older.

(3.) On behalf of the petitioner the contention put forward by learned Counsel is that no part of the cause of action arose within the limits of the jurisdiction of the Munsif of Hazaribagh, who, therefore, had no jurisdiction to hear the suit brought by the plaintiff. In our opinion there is no merit in this argument. The case of the plaintiff is not that there was an over-payment to the defendant on account ot any mistake, but the case of the plaintiff is based on the around that there were transactions between the parties for the supply of cloth and payments through the bank and as a result of the account taken there was a sum due to the plaintiff from the defendant and the suit has been brought for realising this amount. On behalf of the opposite party reference was made in this connection to the decision of the Privy Council in Soniram Jeetmull v. R. D. Tata and Co. Ltd., AIR 1927 PC 156 where it was pointed out that Section 49 of the Contract Act did not get rid of inferences that should justfy be drawn from the terms of the contract itself or from the necessities of the case, involving, in the obligation to pay the creditor, and further obligation of finding the creditor so as to pay him. The principle of this case has of course no direct application to the present case. The principle applies only to a case where there is a direct relationship of debtor and creditor and where the contract itself is a contract of loan and where the presumption is that the payment must have been intended to be made at the creditor's place. But the Privy Council decision is relevant in the present case for the purpose of showing that the court must look into the terms of the contract itself, and into the circumstances and the nature of the contract, in order to draw any inference as to where the parties intended that the money was to be paid. That is the view expressed by Varadachariar, J. in Audinarayana Rao v. Lakshminarayana Rao, AIR 1940 Mad 588 with regard to the ratio decidendi of the Privy Council case. The question for decision in the present case, therefore, is as to where the contract between the parties implied as the place of payment in the circumstances and particular necessities of this case. It is important in this connection to notice the fact that during the material period supply and purchase of cloth was under the Government control and the plaintiff was appointed as a licence holder of "A" class for supply of cloth in the Chatra Subdivision of Hazaribagh district. The supply and sale of cloth was, therefore, made by the plaintiff within the limits of Chatra Subdivision, and the defendant supplied cloth to the plaintiff after a permit was issued by the Cloth Controller allotting the necessary quota to the plaintiff for distribution in Chatra Subdivision. It is true that the detendant sent the consignment to Gaya which is the nearest railway station from Chatra, and the plaintiff also took the consignment at Gaya and the amount was paid through a bank at Gaya. It is manifest therefore that the cloth was supplied by the defendant to the plaintiff after the permit for allotment of quota was made by the Controller and supply of cloth was made for distribution within the Chatra Subdivision by the plaintiff. In view of tin's important circumstance we are of opinion that the intention of the parties to the contract was, by necessary implication, that any payment due to the plaintiff under the terms of the contract was to be made to the plaintiff at Chatra, which is the ordinary place of his business. In this connection we should like to say that though the English rule of common law with regard to the obligation of the debtor to seek the creditor is not applicable to India, it is permissible to take recourse to the English rule for the purpose ot construing the terms of the contract in order to find out where the parties intended by necessary implication that the payment should be made. For these reasons, and also for the other reasons we have expressed, we hold that the intention ot the parties in this case was that the amount due to the plaintiff was to be paid by the defendant at Chatra which was the normal place of business ot the plaintiff, and it follows, therefore, that part ot the cause of action arose within the local limits of the Chatra Munsifi within the jurisdiction of the Munsif of Hazaribagh, within the meaning of Section 20 of the Code of Civil Procedure, and the Munsif of Hazaribagh had, therefore, jurisdiction to try the suit