SITA RAM SAH Vs. STATE OF BIHAR

JUDGEMENT

(1.) In this case the petitioner carried on the business of manufacture of bidis at Deoghar until 29-5-1957. On that day the petitioner gave a notice of closure to his employees, and the reason for the closure was that on 23-3-1957, the workers surrounded the factory where the business of bidi manufacture was carried on and kept all the family members of the petitioner in wrongful confinement for 3 to 4 hours. Later on the members of the petitioner's family were rescued with the help of the police by the Subdivisional Officer of Deoghar, and a criminal case under Section 147/342 of the Indian Penal Code was initiated against several workmen. It is also alleged in paragraph 4 of the affidavit that the workmen attempted to destroy and damage the stock of bidi leaves and the production of bidi manufacture consequently suffered. In view of the attitude of the workmen the petitioner thought that it was no longer possible to carry on the manufacture of bidis and decided to close down the factory. It appears that the workmen subsequently made an application under Section 33-C of the Industrial Disputes Act for recovery of the money due to them from the petitioner under Chapter VA of the Industrial Disputes Act. The application was made to the Deputy Commissioner of Labour, who issued notice to show cause upon the petitioner why the payment should not be made. On 16-12-1957, the petitioner showed cause before the Deputy Commissioner of Labour. Meanwhile the State Government issued a notification on 15-1-1958, under Section 10 (1) of the Industrial Disputes Act, purporting to make a reference of an industrial dispute between the petitioner and the workmen. The notification is annexure D to the application and reads as follows :

(2.) There is no counter-affidavit on behalf of the respondents. There is no appearance on behalf of respondent No. 3, namely, the workmen represented by the Santhal Parganas Bidi Labour Union, Deoghar, and the allegation of the petitioner that the closure of the business was real and bona fide has not been controverted.

(3.) The main submission made by learned counsel On behalf of the petitioner is that the notification of the State Government made under Section 10 (1) of the Industrial Disputes Act is ultra vires and without jurisdiction, because there was a real and bona fide closure of the factory on 30-5-1957, and there could be no industrial dispute in the eye of law on 15-1-1958, when the State Government made the notification under Section 10 (1) of the Industrial Disputes Act. In our opinion the argument addressed on behalf of the petitioner is well founded and must prevail. It is true that the expression "Industrial dispute" has been widely defined in Section 2 (k) of the Industrial Disputes Act, but the definition in Section 2 (k) must be construed in the context of other provisions of the Industrial Disputes Act, which, taken as a whole, assumed the continued existence of an industry. If, therefore, there was a real and bona fide closure of the business by the petitioner on 30-5- 1957, there was no industry in existence on 15-1- 1958, and the State Government had no jurisdiction to make a reference of any industrial dispute on that date. That is the view expressed by a Bench of the Madras High Court consisting of Rajamannar, C. J. and Venkatarama Ayer J. in Indian Metal and Metallurgical Corporation v. Industrial Tribunal, Madras, AIR 1953 Mad 98. An identical view has been expressed by the Supreme Court in Pipraich Sugar Mills Limited v. Pipraich Sugar Mills Mazdoor Union, AIR 1957 SC 95. It was pointed out by the Supreme Court in that case that the object of all labour legislation was firstly to ensure fair terms to the workmen, and secondly to prevent disputes between employers and employees, so that production might not be adversely affected and the larger interests of the public might not suffer. Both these objects can have their fulfilment only in an existing and not a dead industry, and, therefore, the industrial dispute as defined in Section 2 (k) of the Industrial Disputes Act must refer to a dispute which arises out of an existing industry. Therefore, where the business has been closed and it is either admitted or foand that the closure of the business is real and bona fide, any dispute arising with reference thereto will fall outside the ambit and purview of the Industrial Disputes Act. The principle of that decision applies to the present case and we hold, therefore, that the notification made by the State Government under Section 10 (1) of the Industrial Disputes Act on 15-1-1958, which is enclosure D to the application, is ultra vires and illegal and must be quashed by a writ in the nature of certiorari. We further hold that a writ in the nature of mandamus should be issued commanding respondents 1 and 2 not to take further action in pursuance of the notification dated 15-1-1958, which is annexure D to the application. We, however, wish to make it clear that our decision will not affect the application made by the workmen to the Commissioner of Labour and the State Government under Section 33C of the Industrial Disputes Act. That application must be dealt with and disposed of by the State Government in accordance with law.We accordingly allow this application. There will be no order as to costs.