JAGANNATH SINGH Vs. RUPNARAIN SINGH

JUDGEMENT

(1.) In the suit which is the subject matter of this appeal the plaintiff prayed for a declaration that certain alienations made by Musammat Sidei Kuar (defendant No. 4) were not binding upon him and that since Musammat Sidei Kuar had remarried and had forfeited her right to the estate of her former husband, the plaintiff was entitled to recover possession of the alienated properties. The transactions with which we are concerned in this case are Exhibit H, a kebala dated 28-8-1936 executed by defendant No. 4 in favour of defendant No. 1, Exhibit D, a Rehan deed executed on 5-3-1937, by defendant No. 4 in favour of defendant No. 1 and Exhibit F, a Mukarrari deed dated 23-4-1937 executed by defendant No. 4 in favour of defendant No. 1. The case of the plaintiff is that Ratan Singh, the first husband of defendant No. 4, died on 4-10-1915, and defendant No. 4 remarried in the year 1940 or 1941. The lower appellate court has found that the plaintiff was the adopted son of the next reversioner of Ratan Singh and the suit was maintainable by the plaintiff as against the alienees of the widow's estate. It has also been found by the lower appellate court that these transactions are not supported by legal necessity, and the suit was not barred under Article 141 of the Limitation Act. The lower appellate court has accordingly granted a decree in favour of the plaintiff, declaring that these transactions are not binding upon the plaintiff and that be was entitled to recover possession of these properties.

(2.) On behalf of defendant No. 1, who has preferred this appeal learned counsel did not dispute the findings of the lower appellate court with regard to the absence of legal necessity and also on the question that the plaintiff was the adopted son of the next reversioner. Learned Counsel, however, contended that the suit was barred under Article 125 of the Limitation Act, and the Period of limitation was twelve years from the date of alienation by the widow. We do not accept the contention as correct. In our opinion, the proper Article to apply to this case is Article 143 of the Limitation Act which provides a period of twelve years from the date of forfeiture of the estate.

(3.) It was contended by learned counsel on behalf of the appellant that Article 141 of the Limitation Act will not apply to this case and the expression death used in that Article refers to the natural death of the widow, and not civil death, which occurs when the remarriage of a widow takes place. In support of his contention learned Counsel referred to the decision of the Calcutta High Court in Tilottama Dasi v. Madhu Sudan Giri, AIR 1928 Cal 714. But learned counsel conceded that there are authorities which take contrary view, namely Ganpat v. Narayan, AIR 1930 Nag 204, Sawai Ram v. Arjan Singh, AIR 1930 Lah 294. We do not think it is necessary to decide this point. In our opinion, the suit is governed by Article 143 of the Limitation Act because there was forfeiture of the estate of the widow under Section 2 of the Hindu Widow's Re-marriage Act (1856) which reads as follows: