RAGHURAJ PRASAD SINGH Vs. BASUDEO SINGH

JUDGEMENT

(1.) These are plaintiff's second appeals in suits for rent. The plaintiff had originally claimed the value of produce rent for the years 1350 and 1351 but as during the pendency of the suits the produce rent was commuted into cash rent, the plaintiff sought an amendment of the plaint and claimed cash rent; for the years 1348 to 1351. The prayer was allowed and the jama of Rs. 9-3.6 per acre as fixed by the Bent Commutation Officer on 20th September 939 was inserted in the plaint by an order of the learned Munsif dated 19th April 1945. An appeal having been preferred against the order of the Rent Commutation Officer fixing at RS. 9-3-6 per acre, the order of the Rent Commutation Officer was confirmed by the Collector on 4th January 1941. Against the order of the Collector the tenants as well as the landlord filed revision applications before the Commissioner, and the Commissioner remanded the oases with the direction that fresh rates should be fixed after a local inspection. After remand, the Rent Commutation Officer by an order dated 6th January 1944 reduced the rates as originally fixed, and a revised schedule was accordingly prepared. The claim having been made on the basis of Schedule 1 the defendants pleaded that the plaintiff was not entitled to a higher jama than the one fixed by the Commutation Officer after remand. The learned Munsif overruled this contention and decreed the plaintiff's claim at the jama as originally fixed by the Rent Commutation Officer. On appeal the learned Subordinate Judge dismissed the claim for 1348 as time-barred and decreed the claim for the remaining years at the reduced rate which had been entered in Schedule 2.

(2.) The contention on behalf of the plaintiff, appellant before us is that the order of the Commissioner remanding the cases for fixing fresh rates is ultra vires, inasmuch as according to the statute the order of the Collector is final in all such matters, and neither the Commissioner nor the Board of Revenue has jurisdiction to question, modify or reverse that order.

(3.) According to Sub-section (6) (a) of Section 40, Bihar Tenancy Act, an appeal shall lie from an order referred to in Sub-section (5) of Section 40 to the Collector of the district or to any officer especially empowered by the Provincial Government by notification to hear such appeals, if such order is passed by any officer other than the Collector of a district, and the decision of the Collector of the district or of any officer so empowered on any such appeal shall be final. The statute thus does not provide for any appeal or revision application to the Commissioner or the Board of Revenue. Section 112B, Bihar Tenancy Act which provides for an appeal from (sic) an order made under Section 112A contains similar provisions, and it was ruled by this Court in Radhakrishnaji v. Ramkhelawan, 24 Pat. 234 : (A.I.R. (32) 1945 Pat. 179), that because of the provisions of Section 112B, Bihar Tenancy Act, which enacts that the order of the Collector, on the prescribed authority, on appeal from the decision of the Rent Reduction Officer shall be final neither the Commissioner nor the Board of Revenue, has jurisdiction to question, modify or reverse that order, and that any reversal or modification by them would be ultra vires. As was pointed out by Agarwala J., (as he then was) in this decision, where the Legislature has declared the decision of a particular officer or tribunal to be final, no other tribunal can substitute its own decision for the decision of that tribunal and that even if the Commissioner or the Board of Revenue has the power of superintendence over Rent Reduction Officers and the Collector of the district in appeal, that power is confined to preventing such officers from exercising a jurisdiction not conferred on them or compelling them to exercise a jurisdiction which they have omitted to exercise. There is no power in the Commissioner or the Board of Revenue even if they consider that the decision of the subordinate tribunal is wrong in law or in fact, to come to another decision or to substitute their own decision in place of the decision of the subordinate tribunal. Their Lordships in this case referred with approval to the decision of Rankin C. J. in Manmathanath Biswas v. Emperor, 60 Cal. 618 : (A. I. R. (20) 1933 Cal. 132 : 34 Cr. L. J. 299), in which their Lordships of the Calcutta High Court had to consider the power of superintendence as laid down in Section 107, Government of India Act. The principle laid down by Rankin C. J. in this case would be fully applicable to a case in which we have to consider the power of superintendence as conferred on the Commissioner or the Board of Revenue over Rent Seduction Officers and the Collector of the district in appeal. The following observation of Rankin C. J. appears to be important for our present purpose :