MANINDRA NATH BHATTACHARJEE Vs. RAMPADA PAL

JUDGEMENT

(1.) The question for decision in this appeal is whether the respondent can lawfully execute an order dated 10th September 1946 made by the House Controller directing the appellant to vacate a house which is holding No. 175 of the town of Purulia.

(2.) The material facts are not controverted. On 1st July 1946 the respondent filed an application before the House Controller asking that the appellant should be directed to vacate the house. The respondent alleged that the appellant had not paid rent and that the house was required for his own use. On 16th September 1946 the parties filed a compromise petition to the effect that the appellant would quit and vacate the premises within six months from that date and would deliver possession of the same to the respondent. The parties asked that the case should be disposed of in terms of the petition of compromise. The Controller accepted the compromise and made an order in terms thereof. As the appellant did not vacate on the agreed date the respondent applied on 5th January 1948 to the Munsif of Purulia for evicting the appellant from the house. The appellant made an objection that the order of 16th September 1946 could not be executed. The objection wa3 overruled by the learned Munsif whose order has been upheld by the Subordinate Judge in appeal.

(3.) On behalf of the appellant Mr. S.C. Ghosh argued in the first place that the House Controller had no jurisdiction to make the order dated 16th September 1946. He maintained that Section 4 (i), Bihar House Control Order, 1942, did not in express terms confer jurisdiction on the Controller to order eviction of a tenant on the ground of non-payment of rent, that no order of eviction for non-payment of rent could be validly made under Section 4 of the Order. In support of the argument learned counsel referred to Brindaban Behari Lal v. Badri Prasad, A.I.R.. (36) 1949 Pat. 335 : (27 pat. 925) in which a Bench of this Court decided that the Controller cannot legally make an order evicting the tenant on the ground of non-payment of rent under Section 4, House Control Order of 1942. But the facts of the present case are different. For it is not disputed that on 1st July 1946 the respondent had applied for evicting the appellant alleging not merely that there was default in payment of rent but that the respondent required the house for his own use. Under Section 4 (1), House Rent Control Order, 1942 the Controller had jurisdiction on the application of a landlord to direct the tenant to vacate the house if he is satisfied that the house is reasonably and in good faith required by the landlord for his own occupation. It is therefore plain that the House Controller had jurisdiction to make the order dated 16th September 1946 directing the appellant to vacate the house in terms of the petition of compromise. As pointed out by West J. is Amritrav Krishna v. Bala Krishna, 11 Bom. 488. "jurisdiction consists in taking cognizance of a case involving the determination of some jural relation in ascertaining the essential points of it, and in pronouncing upon them." In Pisani v. Attorney-General, Gibralter, (1874) L R. 5 P. C. 516 : (30 L. T. 729), the Judicial Committee pointed oat that where there was jurisdiction over the subject-matter but non-compliance with the procedure prescribed as essential for the exercise of the jurisdiction, the defect might be waived. In Ledgard v. Bull, 13 I. A. 131 : (9 ALL. 191 P. C.), the Judicial Committee held on the facts of the case that there wag no want of jurisdiction but only an irregularity as to Its existence. In pronouncing the Committee's opinion Lord Watson stated :