UNION OF INDIA Vs. KAPOOR CHAND

JUDGEMENT

(1.) THIS writ petition is directed against the order dated 4.8.2006, passed by the Central Administrative Tribunal, Patna Bench, Patna, in OA No.106 of 2005 (Annexure 2), where by the original application preferred by the present respondent has been allowed, and the Railway Administration has been directed that the period spent by the respondent herein as a daily wage employee shall count for the purpose of computation of his post- retirement benefits. The applicant set up his case before the Tribunal that he had worked as a casual labour on daily wages from 10.4.1965 till 30.8.1977. His services were regularized as Carpenter with effect from 31.8.77, and was given the appropriate pay scale. He was given the next higher pay scale on 29.12.96, and was further promoted on 1.3.93. He superannuated on 31.1.2004. He raised a grievance before the Tribunal that the Railway Administration was counting his service from 31.8.77 to 31.1.2004, as a result of which he has been deprived of his full pension. He contended that half of the period spent from 10.4.1965 to 30.8.1977, should count for the purpose of computation of his post-retirement benefits. The Railway Administration stated before the Tribunal that the applicant, on his own showing, had worked as casual worker on daily wages intermittently from 10.4.65 to 30.8.77, and was never engaged continuously as a casual labour. It was also stated on behalf of the Railway Administration before the Tribunal that the original applicant had never completed 120 days as casual labour in which event he would be entitled to count half of the period. On a consideration of the materials on record, the Tribunal has allowed the application.

(2.) LEARNED counsel for the petitioners has assailed the validity of the impugned order on various counts. He submits that, on the own showing of the original applicant, he is not entitled to count half of the period for purpose of computation of post-retirement benefits. He has placed before us the relevant Rules. He also submits that two decisions cited by learned counsel for the respondent herein stand on fundamentally different footing deciding different issues.