PURUSHOTTAM JHA Vs. STATE OF BIHAR

JUDGEMENT

(1.) THE petitioner, a retired judicial officer and a member of the Bihar Judicial Service, has filed this writ petition seeking direction for finalisation/payment of pension, gratuity and unutilised leave salary.

(2.) THE authority slips with respect to all the above three items have since been issued on 10.7.2000 and 20.7.2000 respectively. The grievance of the petitioner however is that the pension etc. have been fixed treating him to have superannuated from service on 31.12.93 whereas by virtue of the extension granted to him in the light of the judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of All India Judges ' Association V/s. Union of India, AIR 1993 SC 2493, he is entitled to reckdn his date of superannuation as 31.7.95 when he attained the age of 60 years. It is said that age of judicial officers stands increased to 60 years by virtue of the aforesaid judgment of the Supreme Court, and as the petitioner admittedly attained the age of 60 years on 31.7.95, he cannot be treated as having retired from an earlier date. !

(3.) THE material facts in this case, it would appear, are not in dispute. The only point is whether the petitioner should be treated as having superannuated with effect from 31.12.93 or 30.6.95. The judgment of the Supreme Court in All India Judges ' Association case (supra) which is the sheet anchor of the petitioner 'scase provides answer to the point. Before noticing the relevant observations from the judgment it is proper to state that the benefit of the increased age of superannuation is not available to the Judicial Officers automatically, it is subject to evaluation of his "potential for continued useful service" by a committee of Judges of the High Court. Such evaluation was/is to be made of judicial officers who have - crossed the age of 57 years and exercised their option for the same within the stipulated period. Such judicial officers who had already crossed the age of 58 years when judgment was delivered on 24.8.93 were deemed to have exercised the option in favour of the enhanced age of superannuation. That is how the petitioner was allowed the benefit of the extended superannuation age. In the ordinary course having crossed the age of 58 years on 31.7.93 he would have retired from service on 1.8.93. The extension was thus not on merit but by virtue of deeming clause as envisaged in the Supreme Court judgment.