V M RAWAL Vs. STATE OF BIHAR

JUDGEMENT

(1.) By the Court The present application has been filed for quashing the order dated 13.4.1998 passed by Chief Judicial Magistrate, Jamshedpur in C/2 Case No. 391 of 1998, whereby and whereunder he has taken cognizance under Section 34(1) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (hereinafter referred to as the 'Act') mechanically and without applying its mind.

(2.) The Assistant Labor Commissioner, Jamshedpur, filed a complaint against the petitioners alleging, inter alia, that the Management of TELCO Company deducted the subscription of Union membership fee @ Rs. 5/- instead of Re. 1/- in violation of the tripartite agreement dated 29.11.1973 between the Union and TELCO Management in violation of the provisions of Sections 18(3) and 19(2) of the Act, which is punishable under Section 29 of the Act. By the impugned order, the learned Chief Judicial Magistrate took cognizance in the case against the petitioner under Section 34(1) of the Act.

(3.) At the very outset, the learned counsel appearing for the petitioners pointed out to me the Section 34(1) of the Act is a provision for taking cognizance and according to the complaint-petition, the alleged offences are punishable under Section 29 of the Act and the learned CJM should have taken cognizance under Section 29 of the Act. So this circumstance alone shows that the learned CJM has not applied his mind and has taken cognizance in the case in a mechanical manner. It was pointed out to me that the learned CJM has filled up the Sections, names of the accused-persons and the word cognizance on a printed form which manifestly shows that he took cognizance of the offence in a mechanical way without applying his mind. It was next submitted that there is nothing in the impugned order which may show that the accused-persons were responsible to an incharge of the affairs of the Company so that it may be inferred that they are responsible for committing the alleged offences. The complaint-petition also does not disclose that the petitioners were responsible to and incharge of the affairs of the Company, so that they could be made accused in the case for the alleged violation of the provisions of the Act. It was, therefore, submitted that the impugned order passed by the learned CJM is not a speaking order and does not reflect that he has applied his mind while taking cognizance in the case against the petitioners. The arguments advanced are well founded and it really appears that the learned CJM has taken cognizance in the case under a wrong Section of the Act in a mechanical manner without applying his mind, that too on a printed form, which deserves to be deprecated. It is also well settled law Pepsi Foods Ltd. V/s. Special J.M. In Pepsi Foods, 1998 AIR(SC) 128 case that the order taking cognizance must reflect that the Magistrate has applied his mind while taking cognizance, which is completely absent in the instant case as the impugned order does not in any way reflect that the learned CJM actually applied his mind while taking cognizance in the case.