GAJENDRA PRASAD SINHA Vs. MAN MOHAN PRASAD SINHA

JUDGEMENT

(1.) THIS revision petition has been preferred under Section 14(8) of the Bihar Buildings (Lease, Rent and Eviction) Control Act, 1982, against the judgment and decree dated 23.11.1995 and 7.12.1995 originally by the Ist Addl. Munsif, Darbhanga, in Eviction Suit No. 17/91 by which the defendants- petitioners have been sought to be evicted on the ground of personal necessity of the plaintiff-opposite party.

(2.) ORIGINALLY , one Maju Mian was the owner of the suit property. The plaintiff-opposite party is retired Government employee. He purchased the suit premises from Maju Mian for a consideration of Rs. 10,000/-. Earlier to the sale deed there was a Mahadanama in favour of the plaintiff-oppsite party on 16.9.1985 on an earnest money of Rs. 2,000/-. Subsequently, also a further sum of Rs. 2,000/- was paid to Maju Mian on 28.8.1988, and after payment of full consideration money the sale deed was executed on 21.6.1990. His name was mutated in the municipal records and the records of the Government of Bihar. After retirement, the plaintiff-opposite party filed the eviction suit for his own accommodation. It is stated that he had no accommodation in the town when he needs the same very much for which purchase was made by him. He has got two marriageable daughters and besides himself he has got his ailing wife residing jointly with him.

(3.) BEFORE this revisional Court various submissions have been made by the learned counsel appearing on behalf of the defendants-petitioners. His first submission is that when the question of title is involved then the decree in the eviction suit is not proper. His second submission is that personal necessity has not been properly adjudicated by the learned Court below and the third and last submission is that the learned Court below did not consider the question of partial eviction, as contemplated under the Act. All the submissions for and on behalf of the petitioners have been averted by the learned counsel for the opposite party and supported the impugned judgment and decree. His contention is that although a suit for specific performance is pending but the same cannot debar the plaintiff from proceeding with the eviction suit, as the defendants had never acquired any title over the suit property uptill now. His further contention is that in the present suit even the alleged agreement of sale had not been filed from the side of the defendant-petitioners. I find much force in the submission of the plaintiff- opposite party. Only because a suit for specific performance is pending wherein the plaintiff is also a party, the same alone cannot be said to be a barrier for granting an eviction decree in favour of the plaintiff when uptill date he has acquired title over the suit property, subject to the decision in the specific performance suit. If the defendant-petitioners succeed in the suit under the Specific Relief Act then he would be entitled for restoration of possession, on the ground of personal necessity, the plaintiff has categorically stated that he purchased the suit property for his accommodation in the town area after his retirement and the suit has been filed after his superannuation stating therein that he is residing in his village home along with his two marriageable daughters and ailing wife. It was admitted by him that his son who practices at Darbhanga as an advocate has also purchased a house wherein he lives with his family but the plaintiff cannot reside there. He has further stated that whenever he comes to Darbhanga for treatment of his ailing wife he some time stays in the Government accommodation, if available, for retired persons or in a hotel. Although it came in the evidence that sometimes he stays with his son also at his house but that alone does not take away the ground of personal necessity of the plaintiff to get the house vacated which has been purchased by him for his own accommodation.