RAGHUNATH Vs. SHASHI PAL CHAUDHARY

JUDGEMENT

(1.) The above appeal filed under Clause 10 of the Letters Patent, yet to be registered as an appeal, has been filed against the order of a learned Single Judge dated 22.3.1999 rejecting the application filed under for the following reasons:

(2.) The Registry has raised an objection on the maintainability of the appeal and, therefore, it is before the Court for orders as to the maintainability. Mr. K.D. Sood, learned Counsel appearing for the Appellants placed strong reliance upon the decisions reported in Shah Babulal Khimji v. Jayaben D. Kania and Anr, 1981 AIR(SC) 1786, Jugal Kishore Paliwal v. S. Sat Jit Singh and Anr, 1984 1 SCC 358 The decision in , AIR 1981 SC 1786 (supra) is a leading case on the subject construing the scope, meaning and purport of word, 'judgment' in the context of Clause 15 of the Letters Patent, Bombay. The learned Judges of the Apex Court on a thorough analysis of the case law on the subject have observed in paragraph 101 that where an order which is the foundation of the jurisdiction of the Court or one which goes to the root of the action, is passed against a particular party, it doubtless amounts to a 'judgment'. In paragraph 115 of the said judgment, it has been stated that every interlocutory order cannot be regarded as a judgment but only those orders would be judgments which decide matters of moment or affect vital and valuable rights of the parties and which work serious injustice to the party concerned, observing at the same time, that the orders passed by the trial Judge deciding question of admissibility or relevancy of a document also cannot be treated as judgments because the grievance on this score can be corrected by the appellate Court in appeal against the final judgment. In paragraph 114 it has also been observed that in the course of the trial, the trial Judge may pass a number of orders whereby some of the various steps to be taken by the parties in prosecution of the suit may be of a routine nature while other orders may cause some inconvenience to one party or the other, namely, an order refusing an adjournment, an order refusing to summon an additional witness or documents, an order refusing to condone the delay in filing documents after the first date of hearing, an order of costs to one of the parties for its default or an order exercising discretion in respect of a procedural matter against one party or the other. Such orders have been held to be purely interlocutory and cannot constitute judgments because it will always be open to the aggrieved party to make a grievance of the order passed against the party concerned in the appeal against the final judgment passed by the trial Judge. This statement of law contained in paragraph 114 of the very judgment relied upon by the learned Counsel for the Appellants is sufficient for us to come to the conclusion that the order under challenge is not one which could be said to be a judgment or an appealable order.

(3.) The decision in , (1984) 1 SCC 358 (supra), does not lay down any new proposition, which could be of any help to the Appellants than what has been stated in the other decision, (noticed supra). The objection raised by the Registry is sustained that the appeal is not maintainable and, therefore, the unnumbered appeal fails and shall stand rejected.