LAWS(HPH)-1999-11-5

AMARJEET SINGH Vs. STATE OF H.P.

Decided On November 02, 1999
AMARJEET SINGH Appellant
V/S
State Of H P And Ors Respondents

JUDGEMENT

(1.) The above writ petition has been filed seeking to set-aside the notice dated 22.9.1994 filed as Annexure-C, as void in law culminating in the proceedings filed as Annexure-K and also to set-aside the notice dated 31.12.1994 filed as Annexure-F as non-est and without jurisdiction. The relief prayed for as above, though it is generally and vaguely worded the sum and substance of the grievance of the Petitioner seems to be against the two notices issued on 22.2.1994 and 31.12.1994 by the 3rd Respondent-Society and the orders passed by the 2nd Respondent dated 30.9.1996 in Civil Miscellaneous Appeal No. 116/96 filed as Annexure-K. The notice dated 22.9.1994 filed as Annexure-C was issued by the counsel for the 3rd Respondent-Society under Section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act purporting to terminate the tenancy in favour of the Petitioner and calling upon him to surrender the possession on or before 1.11.1994 on threat of action under the Himachal Pradesh Public Premises and Land (Eviction and Rent Recovery) Act, 1971 (hereinafter referred to as the Act). Similarly the notice dated 31.12.1994 is the one issued by the Sub-Divisional Collector exercising the powers of the Collector under the Act on being moved by the 3rd Respondent-Society for eviction under the provisions of the said Act. It is seen that on such notice being issued by the Sub-Divisional Collector, the matter came to be decided after hearing the Petitioner and this resulted in an order dated 3.8.1996 filed as Annexure-I whereunder in exercise of the powers under the Act, the Petitioner has been directed to vacate the premises in dispute in addition to paying the compensation at the rate fixed for the unauthorised occupation. The appeal filed by the Petitioner therein came to be also decided against the Petitioner on 30.9.1996 and this order of the Appellate Authority has been filed as Annexure-K. From the orders of the above referred to two statutory authorities, it is found that the tenancy of the Petitioner came to be terminated with effect from 1.11.1994 and when the applicability of the Act as also the proceedings instituted under the said Act for eviction of the Petitioner came to be contested and strongly objected to, the authorities below have categorically held that the provisions of the H.P. Public Premises and Land (Eviction and Rent Recovery) Act, 1971 are attracted to the case on hand and that the Petitioner also rendered himself liable to be evicted on account of lawful termination of the tenancy in his favour and as a consequence of which the Petitioner became the unauthorised occupant of the premises in question. The plea strongly urged before the authorities below about the deposit of the arrears of rent to the account of the Bank which according to the Petitioner has been accepted without demur has been held not to exonerate the Petitioner of the liability incurred to be evicted after due and proper termination of the tenancy in his favour. Hence aggrieved by the orders of the authorities below the above writ petition came to be filed.

(2.) Mr. Sureshwar Thakur, learned Counsel for the Petitioner strongly urged that in the light of the provisions contained under the Himachal Pradesh Urban Rent Control Act, 1987 and protection available to the Petitioner as a tenant the order of eviction could not have been passed by the authorities exercising the powers under the Public Premises Act. According to the learned Counsel for the Petitioner under the provisions of the Himachal Pradesh Urban Rent Control Act, even if the tenant has been held to be in default in payment of rent as long as he paid the same after such determination and quantification within the time stipulated by the competent authority exercising the powers under the H.P. Urban Rent Control Act he is entitled to the benefit of protection of his tenancy and the harsh provisions contained in the Public Premises Act could not have been invoked to the detriment of the Petitioner. In this connection, the learned Counsel for the Petitioner apart from inviting our attention to the relevant provisions of the above referred two legislations also sought to place reliance upon a Division Bench judgment of this Court reported in The Chamba District Co-op. Marketing & Supply Fed. v. State of H.P. and Ors,1999 1 SLC 371, to contend that it is only the Rent Control Act, 1987 that applies to the case on hand and, therefore, initiation of the proceedings under the Public Premises Act, 1971 as also orders passed therein are without jurisdiction and liable to be set aside.

(3.) Per contra, Mr. Bhupender Gupta learned senior Counsel appearing on behalf of the 3rd Respondent-society while placing reliance upon the decision reported in , (1980) 4 SCC 435 M/s. Jain Ink Manufacturing Co. v. Life Insurance Corporation of India and Anr. and, 1990 4 SCC 406, Ashoka Marketing Ltd. and Anr. v. Punjab National Bank and Ors. contended that being a special law applicable to the Public Premises Act as defined under the Act, the Public Premises Act of 1971 is attracted and applicable to the case on hand and has been rightly invoked and orders passed therein and no exception could be taken to the impugned orders. Argued the learned Counsel further that the decision of the Division Bench relied upon for the Petitioner has no application to the case on hand and the same was rendered on the peculiar nature of issues raised therein. It was also further contended that at any rate in the light of the decisions of the Supreme Court, the objections as to the applicability of the Public Premises Act, 1971 has no merit of acceptance. The learned Advocate General has also been heard and the learned Advocate General defended the orders passed by the authorities below as being in accordance with law.