MOHINDER SINGH Vs. STATE OF H.P.

JUDGEMENT

(1.) The petitioner is working as Police Constable and FIR No.276 of 2018 under Sections 353, 332, 147 and 149 of Indian Penal Code has been registered against the petitioner at Police Station Sadar, Una, on the compliant that he along with other co-accused has obstructed/deterred the Special Investigation Unit, Una from discharging its official duty. In view of the fact that FIR has been registered against the petitioner, the respondents issued Article of Charges against him as per Annexure P-2 on 27.09.2019. The sum and substance of Article of Charges is the offences involved in the criminal case which is the subject matter of the FIR. Thereafter the petitioner approached this Court by filing the present petition, though he did not obtain any interim order.

(2.) The prayer made by the petitioner in this petition is to defer the departmental proceedings initiated against him as per Article of Charges. Learned counsel for the petitioner submits that the Article of Charges have been issued on the basis of FIR and when the Article of Charges and the Charges in criminal case are one and the same, the proceedings of the Departmental Inquiry needs to be deferred because it will cause prejudice to the petitioner since the Charges in criminal case and Articles of Charges in Departmental Inquiry may adversely affect his interest in the Departmental Inquiry. Though he had not obtained any interim order, but he participated in the departmental inquiry. The prosecution has examined its witness and marked/exhibited the documents. Also the delinquent-petitioner participated and examined the witness in his defence. After the conclusion of the inquiry, second show cause notice has been issued on 14.11.2019 directing the petitioner to make submission as to why he be not dismissed from service. Against the said order, he approached this Court by way of present petition.

(3.) The first ground taken by the petitioner is that since the Charges framed in the criminal case as well as Article of Charges in the Departmental Inquiry are the same, therefore, the departmental proceeding needs to be stayed. The second ground taken by the petitioner is that as per Rule 16.3 of Punjab Police Rules, 1934, when a Police Officer has been tried and acquitted by a criminal Court he shall not be punished departmentally on the same charge or on a different charge upon the evidence cited in the criminal case. In the instant case since the Article of Charges issued against the petitioner are on the basis of criminal case, hence the Departmental Inquiry should be awaited till the disposal of criminal case. By referring to Rule 16.38 of Punjab Police Rules, 1934 (for short, "PPR"), which relates to r the criminal offences by police officers and strictures by Courts, learned counsel for the petitioner submitted that in view of the peculiar facts and circumstances, the District Magistrate will decide whether the investigation of the complaint shall be conducted by a police officer, or made over to a selected Executive Magistrate. Since the petitioner is also a police officer for special purpose, the investigating officer should have awaited till the concurrence is given by the District Magistrate and in support of his submission, learned counsel relied upon the judgment of Hon'ble Supreme Court in State of Uttar Pradesh and others vs. Surinder Pal Singh, reported in AIR 1989 SC 811 (Para-10). He has also relied upon the judgment of Hon'ble Supreme Court in Civil Appeal No.5822 of 2008, titled as State of Haryana & Ors vs. Ranbir Singh, delivered on 23.09.2008, where the issue was as to whether the dismissal order was null and void for not obtaining the prior concurrence of the District Magistrate, in terms of Rules 16.30 of the PPR as applicable to the State of Haryana which is the constitutional mandate under Article 311 of the Constitution and the answer is that all the Courts below were right in coming to the conclusion that the Departmental Inquiry which was conducted was null and void, without the concurrence of the District Magistrate. On the basis of these two judgments, the learned counsel submitted that the respondents may be directed to defer the proceedings of the Departmental Inquiry.