ARJUN SINGH Vs. LAND ACQUISITION COLLECTOR

JUDGEMENT

(1.) THE above revision has been filed against the order passed by the Land Acquisition Collector, Beas Dam Project, Talwara exercising the powers under Section 28A of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 (hereinafter referred to as the 'Act ') dated 18.11.1995, whereunder the application made by the Petitioner came to be rejected on the ground that it has been made after 91 days and thereby it suffered a delay of one day since the application under Section 28A of the Act was not filed within ninety days as stipulated in the said provision of the Act. In the light of the submissions made by the learned Counsel appearing on either side, I have tried to calculate the at limitation and one stage, I was of the view, with reference to the dates given by the learned Counsel for the Petitioner to be taken into account for computing the period of three months in terms of provision of Section 10A that it comes to only ninety days and, therefore, it may be within the permitted period of 90 days. But Mr. Chauhan, learned Deputy Advocate General brought to my notice that the copy of the Award filed before the Collector claiming benefit under Section 28A of the Act and endorsements made by the Court thereon may be perused and if properly construed and the endorsements and entries made therein are to be taken into account, the exclusion of the period from 13.12.1990, when the copy was attested to 16.9.1991 when the delivery of the copy was taken was not permissible in law and that it would show that the application was barred by limitation. Argued the learned Counsel for the State further, contending that if the applicant sought for a copy of the award and was indifferent in taking delivery even after it was made ready for such a long time, the benefit of such period when he was at lapse cannot be given to his credit, for being excluded from computation. In the light of the above, I had to necessarily took into the very certified copy filed by the Petitioner before the Collector as the basis for claiming benefits under Section 28A. For the purpose of reference and completeness of record, the endorsements as found given on the said certified copy is set out as follows:

(2.) THE learned Counsel for the Petitioner submitted further that if that be so, the proceedings may be remitted to the Collector to enable the Petitioner to present an application under Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963 seeking for condonation of delay, if any, explaining sufficient reasons for such delay. The learned Counsel for the Petitioner placed reliance upon the decision of a Division Bench of this Court reported in 1996(1) SimLC 191 Santokh Singh and Anr. v. State of H.P. and Anr.. That was a case wherein a Division Bench of this Court dealt with an appeal under Section 54 and the validity of an order rejecting a reference made by the District Judge on the ground that it was barred by limitation prescribed in Section 18 of the Act. It was observed relying upon Section 18(3) as also the object underlying Section 28A of the Act and Section 29(2) of the Limitation Act, 1963, that Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963 would apply. Though that was not a case arising directly under Section 28A, the intention of the Legislature in introducing Section 28A was relied upon to construe Section 18 and nature of time -limit stipulated in Section 18 and the character of the Forum or authority, viz., the Collector who has to exercise powers under Section 18 of the Act. This decision is not an authority for the manner in which Section 28A and the period stipulated therein and the applicability or otherwise of Section 5 of the Limitation Act has to be construed or decided. Further Section 18(3) introduced in the Act by a local Amendment inserted by the H.P. State Legislature, treating the Collector as if he were a Court subordinate to the High Court within the meaning of Section 115 and make his order under Section 18 of the Act revisable, convert the Collector exercising jurisdiction under Section 18, a Court for all purposes beyond even the purpose for which the deeming clause has been enacted and make Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963, applicable. Finally, it is not that every statutory provision which stipulates a time -limit can be construed to mean a period of limitation or the authority envisaged to exercise powers a Court and a period of time stipulated, in a given case, would be and may have to be treated as a condition precedent and so construed there is no scope for applying Section 5 of the Limitation Act, to get over the period of time within which alone the power envisaged has to be exercised. Though normally I would have referred this matter to a larger Bench for consideration of the issue, the said course had been rendered unnecessary by a subsequent decision of the Apex Court, directly on point.