RAMESH CHAND Vs. DIRECTOR OF CONSOLIDATION

JUDGEMENT

(1.) WITH the consent of the parties, the present appeal is being disposed of at the admission stage. The present appeal has been preferred by the appellants (respondents before the learned Single Judge) against the order dated 10.7.2007 passed in C.W.P. No. 283 of 2006.

(2.) THE private respondents herein had preferred the above mentioned writ petition assailing the order dated 2.2.2006 of the Director, Consolidation of Holdings, Himachal Pradesh under Section 54 of the H.P. Holdings (Consolidation and Prevention of Fragmentation) Act, 1971 (in short called, 'Act 1971') in case No. 122/2004, whereby the revision petition of the appellants (respondents No. 2 and 3) before learned Single Judge, was accepted.

(3.) THE issue was as to whether the Director, Consolidation of Holdings, Himachal Pradesh has exercised his powers under Section 54 of the 'Act 1971' within reasonable time or not. Such issue has already been adjudicated upon by the Supreme Court in Chairman, Indore Vikas Pradhikaran v. Pure Industrial Coke and Chemicals Ltd. and Ors. AIR 2007 SC 2458 . The term 'reasonable time' used under Section 54 of the 'Act 1971' by the Director, Consolidation of Holdings shall be deemed to be settled in terms of the decision of the Supreme Court in State of H.P. and Ors. v. Raj Kumar Brijender Singh and Ors. (2004) 10 SCC 585 , whereby, the Hon'ble Supreme Court while expressing its view under Section 20(3) of H.P. Ceiling on Land Holdings Act, 1972 has observed that reasonable time as indicated in Section 20(3) of the said Act would depend upon the facts and circumstances of each case. For convenience, relevant paragraph 6 of the decision Raj Kumar Brijender Singh (supra) is quoted as below: We are now left with the second question which was raised by the respondents before the High Court, namely, the delayed exercise of the power under Sub -section (3) of Section 20. As indicated above, the Financial Commissioner exercised the power after 15 years of the order of the Collector. It is true that Sub -section (3) provides that such a prayer may be exercised at any time but this expression does not mean there would be no time -limit or it is in infinity. All that is meant is that such powers should be exercised within a reasonable time. No fixed period of limitation may be laid but unreasonable delay in exercise of the power would tend to undo the things which have attained finality. It depends on the facts and circumstances of each case as to what is the reasonable time within which the power of suo motu action could be exercised. For example, in this case, as the appeal had been withdrawn but the Financial Commissioner had taken up the matter in exercise of his suo motu power, it could well be open for the State to submit that the facts and circumstances were such that it would be within reasonable time but as we have already noted that the order of the Collector which has been interfered with was passed in January 1976 and the appeal preferred by the State was also withdrawn sometime in March, 1976: The learned Counsel for the appellant was not able to point out such other special facts and circumstances by reason of which it could be said that exercise of suo motu power after 15 years of the order interfered with was within a reasonable time. That being the position in our view, the order of the Financial Commissioner stands vitiated having been passed after a long lapse of 15 years of the order which has been interfered with. Therefore, while holding that the Financial Commissioner would have power to proceed suo motu in a suitable case even though an appeal preferred before the lower appellate authority is withdrawn, may be, by the State. Thus the view taken by the High Court is not sustainable. But the order of the Financial Commissioner suffers from the vice of the exercise of the power after unreasonable lapse of time and such delayed action on his part nullifies the order passed by him in exercise of power under Sub -section (3) of Section 20.