PAMWI TISSUES Vs. STATE OF HIMACHAL PRADESH

JUDGEMENT

(1.) IN these three writ petition the common question is whether the award passed by the Presiding Officer, Labour Court, Shimla is liable to be interfered with on account of its suffering from any error on the face of the record. The learned Counsel for the petitioners urges three contentions. The first contention is that the Labour Court in the last paragraph of the award commanded the petitioners herein to reinstate the workers forthwith on the presentation of the copy of the order by them before it with all back wages and consequential benefits and other advantageous payments which may have accrued to them till that date. The learned Counsel submits that this direction or command as it is expressed by the Labour Court is wholly illegal as it runs counter to the specific provisions of Sections 17 and 17-A of the Industrial Disputes Act. There is no doubt whatever that the direction given by the Labour Court is erroneous as it is against the provisions of Sections 17 and 17-A of the Industrial Disputes Act probably , the Labour Court was over enthusiastic in that matter and gave such direction thinking that once its order is presented before some person that will have to be immediately and implicitly obeyed forgetting for a moment that it is only a creature of Industrial. Disputes Act governed by the provisions thereof. Section 17-A provides that an award shall become enforceable on the expiry of thirty days from the date of its publication under Section 17. Section 17 provides for publication of award within a period of thirty days from the date of its receipt by the appropriate Government in such a manner as the appropriate Government thinks fit. Sub-section (2) of Section 17 reads that the award so published shall be final and shall not be called in question by any Court in any manner whatsoever. Thus, it is clear that till the award is published in the manner contemplated by Section 17, it cannot be enforced. This aspect of the matter has been taken note of by the Labour Court itself in penultimate sentence of its award. He has observed: "let a copy of this award be sent to the appropriate Government for its publication". As he himself reconginsed the necessity of publication of the award passed by him the direction given earlier in the last paragraph is unsustainable. We are sure that the concerned authorities in the appropriate Government will take necessary steps for publishing the award under Section l7 of the Act.

(2.) THE second contention of the Learned counsel for the petitioners is that the Labour Court has come to the conclusion that the domestic inquiry is vitiated and the findings arrived at by the Inquiry Officer in the said inquiry are also unwarranted. According to the learned Counsel for the petitioners once the Labour Court has come to such a conclusion it ought to have given an opportunity to the petitioner to adduce evidence before the Labour Court in support of the order of dismissal passed against the Workers. We do not find any substance in this contention for the simple reason that the petitioners herein had sufficient op-opportunity to adduce evidence before the Labour Court. In fact the petitioners had examined a witness on their behalf as R WI. There is no explanation as to why the petitioners did not choose to examine other witnesses if they had thought necessary to do so to support the order of dismissal passed against the workers.

(3.) SECTION 11-A of the Industrial Disputes Act enables the Labour Court to set aside the order of dismissal and direct reinstatement on such terms and conditions if any, as it thinks fit, or given such other relief to the workman including the award of any lesser punishment in lieu of discharge or dismissal as the circumstances of the case may require. Proviso to the Section reads that in any proceeding under this Section the Labour Court shall rely only on the materials on record and shall not take any fresh evidence in relation to the matter.