PARAS RAM Vs. TERHROO AND ANR.

JUDGEMENT

(1.) THIS is a Defendant's revision petition against an order of the learned Subordinate Judge, Sundernagar, extending time for making the deposit contemplated by Section 22(1) of the Punjab Pre -emption Act, 1913.

(2.) THE Respondent filed a suit for pre -emption, and on December 18, 1974 the learned Subordinate Judge directed the Plaintiff to deposit one -fifth of the sale -price within ten days.

(3.) LEARNED Counsel for the Petitioner contends that the learned Subordinate Judge erred in extending the time without notice to the Petitioner. The contention appears to be without force. Section 22(1) of the Punjab Pre -emption Act contemplates an order by the Court, at any time before the settlement of issues, requiring the Plaintiff to deposit a sum not exceeding one -fifth of the probable value of the land or property. Section 22(4) provides that if the Plaintiff fails within the time fixed by the Court, or within such further time as the Court may allow, to make the deposit mentioned under Sub -section (1), his plaint shall be rejected. It is not disputed that initially when the Court fixed the period for the Respondent to make the deposit, there was no right in the Petitioner to be heard in the matter. If that was so, there was equally no right in the Petitioner to be heard when the Court extended the time when it did. A right to intervene could accrue to the Petitioner only when a default occurred in making the deposit. Had the Respondent waited until December 28, 1974, on which date the deposit was due, and instead of making the deposit applied for time the Petitioner would have been entitled to come forward and oppose the grant of further time. That would have been for the reason that on account of the default a right had accrued in the Petitioner to have the plaint rejected. But, in the present case, before the default could occur and, therefore, before any right to intervene could accrue to the Petitioner, the Respondent applied to the Court for extension of time, and the Court extended the time. The power exercised by the Court in extending the time was the same power exercised by it initially in fixing the time.