BHAWNA SINGH Vs. MAGMA LEASING LTD.

JUDGEMENT

(1.) THE petitioners filed a petition under Section 34 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 in the Court of the learned Additional District Judge, Solan for setting aside the arbitral award dated 21st September, 2001 passed by the sole Arbitrator, respondent No.2 herein, namely, Shri S.K. Jain, Advocate, Delhi High Court on various grounds. In the reply filed by respondent No.1 to the said application under Section 34 of 1996 Act, amongst various defences

(2.) WHETHER reporters of the Local Papers are allowed to see the Judgment? raised, respondents took the preliminary objection with respect to the territorial jurisdiction of the Court by contending and submitting that the Court at Solan did not have any territorial jurisdiction and that the territorial jurisdiction vested exclusively in the Courts at Delhi. This plea was based upon and linked with the facts relating to the accrual of the cause of action as well as a specific clause in the Arbitration Agreement conferring exclusive territorial jurisdiction upon the Courts at Delhi. Following five Issues were framed by the learned Court below on 1st November, 2002:-

(3.) THE petitioners do not contest, dispute or assail the finding of the learned Court below with respect to Issue No.2. In other words, the petitioners concede and admit that indeed the Courts at Solan did not have the territorial jurisdiction and the Courts at Delhi had the exclusive jurisdiction to try the aforesaid arbitration application under Section 34 of the 1996 Act. Even otherwise on a perusal of the impugned judgment, I myself find that the learned Court below has rightly decided Issue No.2 against the petitioners because indeed, upon proper appreciation of the material on record the jurisdiction was exclusively of the Courts at Delhi and the Courts at Solan did not have any jurisdiction to try the application. I, however, find that the learned Court below completely erred in finally deciding the application by passing the operative part of the judgment in so far as the grant of final relief is concerned. In para 20 of the judgment (supra) the learned Court below pronounced on the validity of the award by holding it to be legal and binding upon the petitioners. Actually once the learned Court below decided that it had no jurisdiction to try the application, despite its stated finding on Issue No.1, it ought not have declared the award as being legal and binding upon the petitioners in the operative part of the judgment but it should have returned the petition filed under Section 34 of the 1996 Act to the petitioners for presentation before a Court of competent jurisdiction. On that course having been adopted, the finding on Issue No.1 would have become nonest because it was returned by the Court which had no jurisdiction to entertain the application at all.