LAWS(HPH)-1975-10-10

ARUN KUMAR Vs. STATE OF HIMACHAL PRADESH ETC.

Decided On October 27, 1975
ARUN KUMAR Appellant
V/S
State Of Himachal Pradesh Etc. Respondents

JUDGEMENT

(1.) Arun Kumar has filed this writ petition under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution wherein he has asked for the quashing of the judgment dated September 10, 1975 of the Special Tribunal constituted under Sec. 8 of the Defence and Internal Security of India Act, 1971, (hereinafter to be referred to as the Act of 1971) convicting him for an offence under Rule 114 of the Defence and Internal Security of India Rules, 1971 (hereinafter to be referred to as the Rules of 1971) and sentencing him to undergo rigorous imprisonment for three months and to pay a fine of Rs. 5,000/ -, in default of payments of fine to undergo further rigorous imprisonment for three months. The case of the Petitioner is that he carried on the business of General Merchants at Matiana under the name and style of Messrs Vidya Parkash Arun Kumar. On July 12, 1975, the Petitioner's premises were searched and it was alleged that the Petitioner had marked exercise books each at Rs. 2.10 P. although in the display list of prices Rs. 1.85 was exhibited as the price of each exercise book. The District Magistrate, Simla, had issued a notification under Clause 3(1) {d) of the Himachal Pradesh Hoarding and Profiteering Prevention Order, 1974, wherein he had fixed the maximum marginal profit for each exercise book of not more than 3% and by that calculation the price for each exercise book was Rs. 1.87 nP. In this manner it was alleged that the Petitioner was over charging price of each exercise book to the extent of Rs. 0.23 nP. The Petitioner, however, contended that it was not alleged in the report that he offered for. sale any exercise book to any particular person on any particular date and as such the report was incomplete within the meaning of Rule 183 of the Rules of 1971 - According to Petitioner, cognizance could not be taken by the Special Tribunal under Rule 183 and the very prosecution was without jurisdiction. However, the Petitioner was put under arrest and his case was set down before the Special Tribunal for trial. On September 9, 1975, the Petitioner was produced before the Special Tribunal. The police documents were served upon the Petitioner who had also engaged a counsel. The learned Tribunal on hearing the Public Prosecutor as well as the counsel of the accused was of the opinion that a prima facie case for contravention of Clause 4 (c) of the Himachal Pradesh Hoarding and Profiteering Prevention Order, 1974, punishable under Rule 114 of the Rules of 1971 was made out. Accordingly a charge was framed against the Petitioner. The charge was read over and explained to him but the Petitioner was under some confusion to plead guilty. According to him there was no time left to go through the police papers and the learned Tribunal hurried with the trial and upon admission of guilt by the Petitioner straightaway recorded the finding of conviction and sentence. The Petitioner in fact pleaded guilty without understanding the import of the charge. It was pleaded that the notification dated March 8, 1974, of the District Magistrate was not brought to the notice of the Petitioner and as such he could not be convicted for contravention of that notification. The Central Government did not give prior concurrence to the ascertainment of margin of profit as required under the Rules of 1971. In fact the State Government had delegated its power to the District Magistrate which was in excess and the order itself is ultra vires on that account. The Petitioner also contended that the Special Tribunal could not be constituted under law to try offences for contravention of an order made under Sec. 3 of the Act of 1971. As such the Tribunal had neither jurisdiction nor its decision could be considered valid in the eye of law. In fact the Himachal Pradesh Hoarding and Profiteering Prevention Order, 1974, was not published, according to Petitioner, as required under Rule 164 of the Rules of 1971. That was an additional defect as to vires of that order. On these grounds the Petitioner sought for the .quashing of the judgment of the learned Special Tribunal and for setting aside its order of conviction and a sentence.

(2.) The Respondents are the State of Himachal Pradesh; the Special Tribunal, the District Magistrate and the Members of the Special Tribunal. The learned Advocate -General contented to argue out against the petition orally and did not file any return.

(3.) The Petitioner has invoked Article 227 and in the first instance we have to make it clear that the jurisdiction of the High Court in a matter of this nature under Article 227 is very limited. Under Sec. 12 of the Act of 1971, no appeal or revision lay against the decision of the Special Tribunal. It is, therefore, abundantly clear that the High Court will not assume revisional or appellate jurisdiction while exercising its powers under Article 227. If no revision or appeal lay, unless special circumstances were made out, jurisdiction under Article 227 will not be invoked, because that would be denying the provision prohibiting revision or appeal. That apart, the Petitioner was convicted on a plea of guilty and under Sec. 375 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, no appeal lay against the plea of guilty except on the legality or propriety of the sentence. That is an additional factor which circumscribes the jurisdiction of the High Court under Article 227. The entire facet of argument that the charge framed by the Special Tribunal was defective or that any irregularity was committed in taking cognizance, will also lose its significance, inasmuch as, all these defects are curable in any ordinary trial under the Code of Criminal Procedure. This is no doubt subject to a plea of prejudice or substantial injustice which may have resulted. If jurisdictional limitations adumbrated above are there, it would hardly be a case for interference under Article 227 unless jurisdictional error of a grave nature is pointed out or complete failure of justice is inferred, by showing a wrong application of law or procedure as applicable to the facts of the case. Therefore, the Petitioner has obviously to substantiate his case with all these limitations and no interference under Article 227 will be permissible unless a miscarriage of justice is pointed out.