M.J.STONE Vs. UNION OF INDIA

JUDGEMENT

(1.) THESE three first appeals are directed against the decision of the Motor Accident Claims Tribunal under Section 110-B of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939. On December 20,1968 at about three miles from Wangtu Bridge and at 3 p. m. a petrol tanker (HRA 1807) belonging to respondents 1 and 2 was coming from Sungra and was going to Wangtu on the Hindustan Tibet Road. The tanker belonged to respondent National Carrier and Gajender Singh respondent was driving it. One Bishambhar Dass (P. W. 9) was the Conductor. This Tanker was admittedly going on the wrong side of the road and when it reached a curve it was met with a military one tonner truck HC 15455 which was coming from Wangtu side. The tanker being on the wrong side was hit by the military truck, with the result that a very unfortunate accident took place. The truck swered towards its right and fell into the river Sutlej. It was being driven by Sepoy Kailash Yadav and four other employees of the military were occupying the other seats. All the five persons died as a result of that accident. Accordingly the heirs of the deceased instituted Claims before the Motor Accident Claims Tribunal and four such applications were filed.

(2.) THE respondents were National Carriers, Gajender Singh, Oriental Insurance and also the Union of India. The case of the claimants was that either it was the negligence of the tanker or of the truck and they are liable to be paid compensation by the first three respondents or by the Union of India. The defence was the usual denial. The Union of India contended that the negligence was of Gajender Singh while on behalf of the respondents 1 to 3 it was contended that the negligence was of Sepoy Kailash Yadav.

(3.) THE crucial question that arises in the present case is the liability of the minors for the statement of Smt. M. J. Stone and for the statements of the learned Advocates. Under Order 32, Rule 7 of the Civil P. C. an agreement or compromise by next friend, without the leave of the Court expressly recorded in the proceeding is void as against the minors although voidable as against the other parties. The question that fell for determination is as to whether Order 32, Rule 7 is applicable in a proceeding before a Motor Accident Claims Tribunal. Under Section 110-C of the Motor Vehicles Act, the Claims Tribunal has all the powers of a Civil Court for the purposes of taking evidence on oath and of enforcing the attendance of witnesses and of compelling the discovery and production of documents and material objects. Besides that the Claims Tribunal has such other powers under the Civil P. C. as may be prescribed. Rule 20 of the Motor Accident Claims Tribunal Rules, 1960 enumerates such other powers and the learned counsel pointed out that Order 32, Rule 7 of the Civil P. C. is not mentioned therein. Be it as it may, the safeguard against minors as provided in Order 32, Rule 7 will be applicable to a proceeding before the Claims Tribunal on the principle of equity, justice and good conscience. Admittedly there is no prohibition in the Motor Vehicles Act or its rules for application of the principle involved in Order 32, Rule 7 and in my opinion the said principles being of natural justice must be invoked even in a proceeding before Claims Tribunal. In Bishundeo Narain v. Seogeni Rao, (AIR 1951 SC 280), it is held that the Judge is not only required to pass an order giving permission to such compromise but he is also required to express that the compromise is for the benefit of the minors. In Chhangu Aheer v. Dukhi Aheer, (AIR 1967 All 273) the language of Rule 7 of Order 32 was not considered as susceptible of a presumption being raised in favour of the agreement or compromise entered into on behalf of a minor without an order of the Court. The provision was held mandatory and requires the guardian or next friend to obtain leave of the Court for entering into a compromise and such permission must appear expressly in the proceeding of the Court. As observed by the Supreme Court, the Judge has to ascertain that the agreement or compromise is for the benefit of the minors. There can be no denial that in the present three appeals neither the Court gave permission to enter into the compromises nor did it apply its mind as to whether the compromise was for the benefit of the minors. Thus under Order 32, Rule 7, the compromises cannot be adhered to and are void as against the minors. They are also voidable as against Smt.