ARUN BAGAI Vs. STATE OF HIMACHAL PRADESH

JUDGEMENT

(1.) Petitioner herein is alleged to have committed offences under Sections 279 and 337 of the Indian Penal Code and under Section 187 of the Motor Vehicles Act. Through this petition, he seeks quashing of proceedings launched against him and pending before the learned trial Court, in pursuance to FIR No. 45, dated 16.04.2012, lodged in Police Station, Aut, District Mandi, H.P. During the pendency of proceedings before this Court, the parties arrived at a settlement. The settlement deed arrived at inter se the petitioner herein (accused) and the respondent No. 2 herein (complainant), stands tendered in sequel to their statements recorded in writing before this Court and duly signatured by the accused and the complainant, respectively.

(2.) A perusal of the statement of the respondent (complainant), discloses the fact of the compromise deed, as tendered by him alongwith the petitioner herein (accused), having been arrived at voluntarily and without any exercise of coercion and undue influence, as such, when its execution is bereft of any compulsion, the disclosure in the compromise deed arrived at inter se the petitioner herein and the respondent of the dispute inter se the parties, arising out of a motor vehicle accident, which sequelled the constitution of offences against the accused under Sections 279 and 337 of the Indian Penal Code and under Section 187 of the Motor Vehicles Act, having been settled, is to be revered, besides lack of any exercise of any compulsion or duress by any of the executing parties to it, lends it probative force. Therefore, when the settlement deed arrived at inter se the complainant and the accused bespeaks of the complainant willing to terminate the proceedings pending against the accused in the trial Court lends aggravated momentum for its vindication by this Court, besides when the injuries which were gained on the person of minor son of the respondent No. 2 (complainant), are simple in nature is also a propellant for inducing this Court to accept the settlement deed arrived at inter se the accused and the complainant. The beacon of light in guiding this Court to exercise its jurisdiction vested under Section 482 of the Cr. P.C., inasmuch as to what considerations ought to prevail upon this Court while exercising its jurisdiction, are encapsulated in the judgment of the Apex Court reported in Gian Singh Vs. State of Punjab & Another, Special Leave Petition (CRL) No. 8989 of 2010, wherein the Apex Court has held as under:

(3.) Given the factum of the arriving of a voluntary compromise inter se the petitioner herein and the respondent No. 2 (complainant) and when given the plentitude of the powers conferred upon this Court under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure and their exercise being fettered only in the event of the purported culpable act of the accused constituting an offence under Section 302 of the Indian Penal Code or an offence under Section 376 of the Indian Penal Code, whereas, when the offence s constituted by the purported culpable act of the petitioner are under Sections 279 and 337 of the Indian Penal Code and under Section 187 of the Motor Vehicles Act, this Court hence in exercise of the powers vested under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure , is prodded to, given the minimality of the injuries purportedly inflicted on the person of the accused and lack of interdict by the Hon'ble Apex Court against the quashing of criminal proceedings when the culpable act is constituted under the aforesaid provisions of the Indian Penal Code , rather given the free and fair compromise/settlement arrived at inter se the complainant and the accused, with aplomb vindicate the settlement. In aftermath, this Court is propelled to exercise jurisdiction vested under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Code, its exercise cumulative ly for the reasons aforesaid, being not restricted, circumscribed or trammeled, qua the offences constituted in the FIR against the accused. Consequently, to also beget cordiality inter se the petitioner and the respondent No. 2 (complainant), the settlement is hence accepted.