AMIT KUMAR Vs. STATE OF H.P.

JUDGEMENT

(1.) IN its impugned order the learned trial Court while suo moto exercising powers under Section 311 Cr.P.C. ordered the summoning of Naresh Kumar, the victim of the offence as also of Ms. Rain Sudha Arora, the owner of the offending vehicle as witnesses. The necessity which prevailed upon the learned trial Court to Suo moto summon Naresh Kumar and Ms. Rain Sudha as witnesses to sustain the charge against the accused/revisionist herein arose from the factum of the Investigating Officer having in his final report erroneously displayed qua the victim of the offence, Naresh Kumar, while being in -capacitated by the injuries sustained by him in the accident, hence his being rendered incompetent to depose as a prosecution witness. The occurrence of the aforesaid erroneous reflection therein was inferred by the learned trial Court to arise from the factum of Naresh Kumar having in a petition preferred before the learned MACT -II, Sirmaur at Nahan for compensation arising from his having sustained injures in a motor vehicles accident allegedly caused by the rash and negligent driving of its driver, deposed as a witness before it. The learned counsel for the petitioner has not controverted the factum as displayed in the order impugned before this Court, of Naresh Kumar having deposed as a witness before the MACT -II Sirmaur at Nahan. Consequently, the learned trial Court did not err in concluding in its impugned order of the Investigating officer having fallaciously displayed in his final report the factum of the victim of the offence namely Naresh Kumar while being enjoined with a disability gained by him in a Motor vehicles accident his being disabled besides incompetent to depose as a witness before the learned trial Court for sustaining the prosecution case. However, the limited address by the learned counsel for the petitioner herein before this Court for seeking reversal of the impugned order is hinged upon the factum of the power invested in the learned trial Court under Section 311 of Cr.P.C. being available for reliance or succor only prior to the recording of the statement of the accused under Section 313 of Cr.P.C. or prior to the recording of the depositions of the witnesses adduced in his defence by the accused. Its dependence by the learned trial Court subsequent to the completion of the aforesaid stages is canvassed to be grossly untenable as any reliance thereupon thereafter preceding the rendition of a judgment by the learned trial Court, especially with the proceedings occurring thereafter not tantamounting to pendency of "a trial" before the learned trial Court whereat only its invocation by the learned trial Court would be rendered legally proper. In other words he contends that on completion of the aforesaid stages besides prior to rendition of a judgment by the learned trial Court, the trial stood concluded or terminated, hence the provisions of section 311 Cr.P.C. are un -attractable thereafter as untenably invoked by the learned trial Court. In sustaining the aforesaid submission the learned counsel for the petitioner relies upon a judgment reported in : 2004 CRI.L.J. 555 titled K. Sajeendran v. Secretary, Thalakulathur Gram Panchayat, whose relevant paragraphs 6 to 8 stand extracted hereinafter.

(2.) HOWEVER , the aforesaid submission is legally frail nor also the judgment relied upon by the learned counsel for the petitioner is of any avail to him as the relevant afore extracted paragraphs though dwells upon the stage at which a trial against the accused concludes during course whereof only succor can be suo moto drawn by the learned trial court upon the provisions of section 311 Cr.P.C. for summoning any witness/witnesses deemed fit for facilitating or advancing the cause of justice. Contrarily when it has omitted to dwell upon the factum of the signification borne by the subsequent phraseology "other proceedings" occurring in section 311 during whose pendency also the learned trial Court may suo moto draw sustenance thereupon for summoning any witness/witnesses deemed fit besides expedient in its wisdom on an application of mind by it to the available material on record for facilitating it to determine the guilt of the accused qua the offences for which he stood charged especially when the signification borne by the phraseology "other proceedings" to the considered mind of this court takes within its gamut or domain the proceedings occurring subsequent to the conclusion of proceedings under Section 313 of Cr.P.C. as also subsequent to the recording of deposition of the defence witnesses adduced by the accused in his defence before the learned trial Court. In the judgment relied upon by the learned counsel for the petitioner supra the learned Court had attributed to the phrase "other proceedings" occurring in Section 311 Cr.P.C. the signification or the parlance of it being alternate to trial or inquiry however, even if the trial or inquiry against the accused stood, on closure of proceedings under Section 313 Cr.P.C. as also on closure of adduction of defence evidence by the accused, terminated, the other proceedings occurring thereafter remained un -terminated yet open in as much as the proceedings qua the addressing of arguments before the learned trial Court by the learned counsel on either side. Given the aforesaid ascription to the signification borne by "other proceedings" occurring in section 311 Cr.P.C. naturally when the signification thereof encompasses the stage apposite to the addressing of arguments before the learned trial Court by the learned counsel on either side necessarily the institution of an application at a stage preceding completion of arguments before the learned trial Court, fell within the ambit of the signification borne by the phraseology "other proceedings" occurring in Section 311 Cr.P.C. Necessarily then even when the trial against the accused stood closed or completed on completion of proceedings under Section 313 Cr.P.C. or on completion of adduction of evidence in defence by the accused, the learned court was yet seized with jurisdiction to, even before rendition of a judgment, for empowering it to do complete justice, suo moto summon any witness/witnesses as deemed expedient and fit. In the learned trial Court hence having preceding the rendition of a judgment suo moto exercised powers under Section 311 Cr.P.C. by summoning Naresh Kumar, victim of the offence and Ms. Rain Sudha Arora, the owner of the offending vehicle as witnesses has not committed a gross impropriety or illegality necessitating interference by this Court in the exercise of its revisional jurisdiction. Apart therefrom even if the victim of the offence is permitted to be led into the witness box no prejudice will be caused to the accused as in the event of his deposing in contradiction to his recorded deposition before the MACT -II, Sirmaur at Nahan, it would be open to the learned defence counsel while conducting his cross -examination to impeach his creditworthiness for belittling his version qua the incident comprised in his examination in chief by confronting him with his previous statement. In view of the above, present petition is dismissed alongwith pending applications, if any.