VINOD KUMAR Vs. RAJESH KUMAR

JUDGEMENT

(1.) Both these Civil Revisions (C.R. No. 126 of 1994 and C.R. No. 127 of 1994) are being decided by a common judgment as these involve similar facts and questions of law between the same parties Civil Revision No 126 of 1994 is directed against the order dated 18 -3 -1994 whereby the application under Order 22, Rule 4, C.P.C filed by the petitioner was allowed and the respondents were ordered to be impleaded in place of the original respondent Madan Lal, though the petitioner had prayed in his application for the impleadment of respondent No.3, Smt. Darshani Devi, being widow of Madan Lal. The petitioner is aggrieved by (he impugned order as respondent Nos.1 and 2 who are sons of Madan Lal original respondent have also been brought on record besides their mother, respondent No.3, as party respondents in Rent Petition No.1/2 of 1989 filed by the petitioner landlord on the ground of non -payment of rent and sub -letting. Admittedly, the premises in question is a shop which was in the occupation of Madan Lal on a monthly rent of Rs. 100 and continues to be in possession of respondents after his death.

(2.) So far Civil Revision No. 127 of 1994 is concerned, it is directed against the order dated 18 -3 -1994 whereby the application under Order 23, Rule 3, C.P.C. moved on behalf of the legal heirs was allowed and the respondents in the present petition were brought on record in Civil Suit No. 35/1 of 1990 pending in the Court of Sub -Judge 1st Class, Nahan, which was filed by original plaintiff Madan Lal In the said suit, Madan Lal has prayed for specific performance of contract arising out of a compromise dated 19 -11 -1987 between him and the petitioner landlord in terms whereof the petitioner landlord was to rebuild the shop with stipulated specifications and hand it over to Madan Lal on a monthly rent of Rs. 100 per month. The main grievance made in the Civil suit is that though the shop was rebuilt and handed over to him as per the terms of the compromise, yet, its specifications are not as agreed upon in the compromise. The petitioner -defendant has resisted the suit on various grounds and has denied the allegations made therein. When on the death of Madan Lal, his legal representatives moved an application under Order 23, Rule 3, C.P.C. for bringing them on record, the petitioner defendant opposed the same on the ground that only the widow of Madan Lal Respondent No.1 was required to be brought on record as plaintiff because only she has a right to inherit the statutory tenancy of Madan Lal. The trial Court has rejected this plea and allowed the application under Order 22, Rule 4, C.P.C bringing all the representatives on record.

(3.) This Court has heard the learned Counsel for the parties and gone through the record. The common question of law arising in both the petitions is that on the interpretation of section 2 (j) of the Himachal Pradesh Urban Rent Control Act, 1987 (hereinafter called the 1987 Act) which of the legal representatives of Madan Lal has a right to continue with the suit No. 35/1 of 1990 pending in the Court of Sub -Judge 1st Class, Nahan, as well as to contest the rent petition No. 1/2 of 1989 pending in the Court of Rent Controller (2), Nahan. Section 2 (j) of the 1987 Act is as under : - " tenant means any person by whom or on whose account rent is payable for a building or rented land and includes a tenant continuing in possession after termination of the tenancy and in the event of the death of such person such of his heirs as are mentioned in Schedule I to this Act and who were ordinarily residing with him at the time of his death, subject to the order of succession and conditions specified, respectively in Explanation I and Explanation II to this clause, but does not include a person placed in occupation of a building or rented land by its tenant, except with the written consent of the landlord, or a person to whom the collection of rent or fees in a public market, cart stand or slaughter house or of rents for shops has been farmed out or leased by a municipal corporation or a Municipal Committee or a notified area committee or a cantonment board ; Explanation I. -The order of succession in the event of death of the person continuing in possession after the termination of his tenancy shall be as follows : - (a) firstly, his surviving spouse ; (b) secondly, his son or daughter, or both, if there is no surviving spouse, or if the surviving spouse did not ordinarily live with the deceased person as a member of his family upto the date of his death ; (c) thirdly, his parent(s), if there is no surviving spouse, son or daughter of the deceased person or if such surviving spouse, son, daughter or any of them, did not ordinarily live in the premises as a member of the family of the deceased person upto the date of his death ; and (d) fourthly, his daughter -in -law, being the widow of his predeceased son, if there is no surviving spouse, son, daughter or parent(s) of the deceased person or if such surviving spouse, son, daughter or parent(s), or any of them, did not ordinarily live in the premises as a member of the family of the deceased person upto the date of his death ; Explanation II. -The right of every successor, referred to in Explanation I, to continue in possession after the termination of the tenancy, shall be personal to him and shall not, on the death of such successor, devolve on any of his heirs ; and (k).............."