MANGAL CHAND Vs. FOREST DEPARTMENT

JUDGEMENT

(1.) THIS appeal under Section 30 of the Workmen's Compensation Act, 1923 (hereinafter referred to as 'the Act") is preferred by the original claimant (father of the deceased workman) against the order passed by the Commissioner for Workmen's Compensation, Rampur (hereinafter referred to as 'the Commissioner') disallowing the claim to compensation on the ground that the same was time barred.

(2.) THE facts briefly stated are that the appellant preferred the claim before the learned Commissioner against the State Government (Forest Department) on April 4, 1981 alleging that his son met with death as a result of the injury caused to him by an accident arising out of and in the course of his employment on 11th September, 1974. The Divisional Forest Officer, Nichar, District Kinnaur, who was served with the notice of the claim, filed a written statement on 20th October, 1982, inter alia, denying the liability and raising the plea of limitation. It appears that the case proceeded ex parte against the respondent and the evidence of the appellant and his witnesses was recorded. The learned Commissioner held that the claim was not preferred within the time limited by law and that sufficient cause was not shown for preferring the claim beyond the prescribed period. Be it noted that the learned Commissioner was inclined to condone the delay till the middle of April, 1980 on the ground that a communication dated 14th April, 1980 addressed by the Chief Conservator of Forests to the appellant finally disclaiming liability and advising that a claim, if any, might be preferred against the concerned contractor was received by the appellant at or about the said lime. The learned Commissioner was, however, of the view that the claim was preferred after the expiry of a period of about one year even after the receipt of the said communication and that the said delay having not been explained, sufficient cause to condone the delay was not made out. Under the circumstances, without entering into the merits of the dispute between the parties, the claim was disallowed as time barred. Hence the present appeal.

(3.) BEFORE dealing with the question whether the decision of the learned Commissioner is in accordance with law, it is worthwhile to refer to the observations of the Supreme Court in Trustees, Bombay Port v. Premier Automobiles in regard to the plea of limitation raised by public authorities. That was a case of a petty claim of Rs. 1,177. 42 paise made by a commercial man against the Bombay Port Trust (Bailees) for a missing article or its value by way of damages and the suit was ultimately found to have been instituted a little over 10 days beyond the period of limitation. The Supreme Court noted that the defendant had dissuaded the plaintiff in that case from instituting the suit by its promises of search for the lost article but had finally pleaded helplessness. When the plaintiff filed the suit, however, the plea of limitation was raised and it was stoutly persisted upto the highest court. The Supreme Court said, in the context of these facts: We are of the view, in reiteration of earlier expression on the same lines, that public bodies should resist the temptation to take technical pleas or defeat honest claims by legally permissible but marginally unjust contentions, including narrow limitation. . . it is doubtful morality to non-suit solely on grounds of limitation, a plaintiff who is taken in by seemingly responsible representation only to find himself fooled by his credibility. . . public institutions convict themselves of untrustworthiness out of their own mouth by resorting to such defences. These observations are required to be borne in mind by every public authority, more particularly by the State. The injunction contained in the first part of these observations, which were made in a purely commercial cause, applies with still greater force in a case like the present. The Act has been enacted by the Parliament to provide for the payment of compensation by certain classes of employers including the State to their workmen or their dependants for injury or death, as the case may be, by accident caused under certain circumstances. It is surprising that when it comes to the implementation of such a beneficent law, the State and/or its limbs should try to defeat a claim not on merits but on technical pleas such as limitation. It is legitimate to hope that bearing in mind the injunction of the Supreme Court in the above mentioned case, public authorities would desist from raising such pleas in future in appropriate cases like the present irrespective of the margin of delay. But that is not all. The thrust of the sharp criticism contained in the second part of those observations relating to the conduct of public authorities, who lure an unwary litigant into a particular belief and then turn round and take up such defences as limitation, must as well be borne in mind by public authorities including the State in all such cases. The circumstances, to be presently pointed out, would show that the State convicts itself of untrustworthiness out of its own mouth by resorting to such defences in a case like the present.