SHOBH RAM Vs. STATE OF H.P.

JUDGEMENT

(1.) The petitioner had approached the Himachal Pradesh Administrative Tribunal by filing Original Application 472/2004, assailing the order dated 25.2.2004, issued by respondent No. 2, whereby the petitioner was transferred from Baghani Range, Paonta Forest Division to Wild Life Range, Dhameta, Wild Life Division, Hamirpur. The petitioner obviously was simultaneously also insisting before the Tribunal for passing an order in the nature of grant of an interim relief, for staying the implementation and operation of the aforesaid transfer order dated 25.2.2004.

(2.) The Tribunal, vide its order dated 23.4.2004, passed in OA No. 472/2004, and under challenge in this petition filed under Articles 226/227 of the Constitution, has granted three weeks time to the respondents in the Original Application to file sur rejoinder. However, in so far as the petitioners prayer for stay of the operation of the impugned transfer order is concerned, the Tribunal has, by adopting a casual approach, merely made a passing observation that since the transfer was made with the prior approval of the competent authority and further since the petitioner had been relieved with effect from 25.2.2004, no order, one way or the other could be passed by the Tribunal staying or refusing to stay the operation of the order of transfer.

(3.) We are not unmindful of the fact that the petitioner indeed might actually have been relieved on 25.2.2004. That however should not have detracted the Tribunal by summarily refusing to consider the prayer of the petitioner for grant of interim relief, of course on its merits and in accordance with law. We are saying so because apparently the Tribunal in the present case perhaps was unmindful of the established legal principles on the subject that it did not lose jurisdiction in considering the request of a petitioner for staying the operation of a transfer order, even if the transfer order had stood implemented. If a person aggrieved of the issuance of a transfer order approaches a Court or a competent Tribunal assailing the same on grounds tenable under law, and if such a person even at the interim, or at an interlocutory stage fully satisfies and convinces the Court or the competent Tribunal that the transfer order was indeed passed in violation of law, the mere implementation of the transfer order or the fact that the aggrieved petitioner had been relieved from the post from where he was transferred, those facts by themselves cannot be a ground for refusing to stay the operation of the impugned order or to keep it under suspension or in abeyance. We are not unmindful of the established constitutional position in Service Jurisprudence also that Courts normally do not interfere in the transfer orders lightly and unless a transfer order really suffers from such patent constitutional or legal defect as would warrant interference, its implementation or its operation is not disturbed by the Courts. But at the same time, we are also not oblivious of the established constitutional position that if a petitioner convincingly satisfies the Court that the impugned transfer order did suffer patently on account of a defect either in law or otherwise and that, based on established constitutional parameters the interference of the Court indeed is warranted, merely because the order has been implemented or that the petitioner has been relieved should not in normal circumstances inhibit the Court or the Tribunal in undoing the damage, or what in legal parlance is commonly known, in ordering the restoration of status - quo ante. Of course the passing of such an interim order has to be based on absolutely convincing reasons and on the basis of satisfaction of the Court/Tribunal to be recorded in writing supported by cogent reasons and grounds, as it should not, and cannot be done in a casual or light -hearted manner.