(1.) All these petitions are being disposed of together as a common question has been raised with respect to the legality of the award passed by the learned Labour Court in proceedings instituted by the respondent under Section 10 of the Industrial Disputes Act (hereinafter referred to as the Act). The respondents, in each of the petitions, was provided employment by the petitioner herein pursuant to the interim order passed by this Court in C.W.P. No. 488 of 1991, titled Desh Raj and Others v. National Hydroelectric Power Corporation Ltd. and Others directing:
(2.) A number of contentions have been raised by learned counsel appearing for the petitioner before me. Learned counsel submits that the learned Tribunal was in grave error in not considering the fact that the employment of the petitioners was only because of the Court orders and they had not been retained/employed by virtue of any independent contract. Learned counsel submits that in this eventuality, once the writ petition was dismissed by this Court, as noticed supra, which order was affirmed by the Hon'ble Supreme Court, the relationship of master and servant ceased and in this eventuality, the petitioner(s) could not claim the benefit of any violation of "The Act'. The argument though attractive, cannot be accepted for this reason that the interim order which has been reproduced in some detail was passed on 13.1.1993 which was then set aside on 20.12.1996. The Special Leave Petition was dismissed by the Hon'ble Supreme Court on 10.1.1998. The termination order Annexure P1/T was passed on 13.4.1998 (in C.W.P. No. 2940 of 2011) and is identical in all respects in all petitions. There is no explanation on record as to why immediately after the writ petitions were dismissed no action for termination of the services of the petitioner(s) was initiated/taken in case their services were not required by the respondent. What was urged before me was the fact that this action was postponed in deference to the Majesty of Law more especially when Special Leave Petition against the order passed by the High Court had in fact been preferred before the Supreme Court. The petitioner herein did not want to complicate the matter resulting in multiplicity of litigations as also to avoid any proceedings under the Contempt of Courts Act.
(3.) Learned counsel appearing for the petitioner has taken me through the pleadings before the learned Tribunal in detail to urge that in obedience to the interim order issued by this Court, the petitioner(s) stayed their hands for taking any other or further action. I cannot accept this submission for the reason that since the judgment was passed by the Division Bench, it was open to the petitioner herein to have dismissed/dispensed with the services of each of the petitioners. The order of dismissal of the petitioner(s) was passed on 13.4.1998 though the judgment of the Division Bench was delivered by this Court on 20.12.1996. There was no interim order passed by this Court protecting the petitioner(s) till their appeal is admitted by the Supreme Court. No interim order/direction was issued by the Hon'ble Supreme Court staying the operation of the order passed by the Division Bench of this Court. Admittedly, the petitioner(s) remained/continued in service for more than a year which employment was not pursuant to any order passed by this Court or the Supreme Court. In these circumstances, the contention as urged cannot be accepted. There is no explanation as to why the petitioner(s) were retained in service. I do not find any basis in the pleadings before the learned Tribunal or the evidence to establish that the continuation of the workman(en) in service was pursuant to an order passed by the Court restraining the petitioner herein from dispensing with their services. The only pleading before the learned Tribunal to the claim of the workmen is: