(1.) The petitioners, before me, under Article 226 of the Constitution of India are old tenants in occupation of a property known as the Metro-pole Hotel Estate at Simla. On 16th March, 1968, a notification under Sec. 4 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 (hereinafter referred to as 'the Act') dated 2nd February, 1968. was published in the official gazette showing that this property was to be acquired, proceedings under Sections 5-A and 6, and, thereafter, an award dated 30th October, 1969, under Section 11 of the Act took place in accordance with law. These proceedings are not challenged by the petitioners. The opposite party No. 1 is the Land Acquisition Collector of Simla who, after the above-mentioned proceedings, authorized his Naib-Tehsildar, opposite party No. 2, to take possession of the property acquired for a public purpose as indicated above. Opposite party No. 3 is the Secretary to the Public Works' Department of the Government of Himanchal Pradesh. Opposite party No. 4 is the former Manager of the Metropole. Hotel apparently supporting the case of the petitioners whose objections are confined to what took place after the 9th of March, 1970. The petitioners' case is that whatever was legally possible for the Land Acquisition Collector, opposite party No. 2, to do tinder the law had been done on 9th March, 1970. and, thereafter, the further steps taken by opposite party No. 1 through opposite party No. 2 or otherwise are illegal and must be quashed. I may here Indicate what took place on and after 9th March, 1970.
(2.) On 9-3-1970, three documents were executed (Annexures A, B and C). The first of these (Annexure A) merely seems to give the details of the property shown in the notifications under Sec-tions 4 and 6 of the Act and indicates that it was handed over by the Manager and a co-owner to the Naib-Tehsildar, S. N. Pitra, opposite party No. 2. The next document dated 9th March, 1970 (Annexure B), executed by the former Manager and a co-owner shows that possession of room No. 22 and the Bar-room could not be handed over because certain goods belonging to the former owners wore lying there, but it mentions that this accommodation will also be vacated in a day or two so that vacant possession of these rooms could be handed over. The third document of the same date (Annexure C) indicates that a list of tenants and details of accommodation in their occupation were also handed over by the former owners and the former Manager to S. N. Pitra, Naib-Tehsildar. A subsequent note in this very document shows that possession of Room No. 22 and of the Bar-room together with certain. fittings were handed over on 26-3-1970. On 12th June, 1970, a letter (Annexure D) was sent by the Executive Engineer to certain tenants advising them to vacate the accommodation occupied bv them as it was not safe for human habitation, and, informing them that, if they continued to remain in occupation, they could do so at their own risk. After this, a general notice (Annexure F) dated 24th November, 1969, directing that the premises in question should be vacated and possession of it be delivered on 8th December, 1969, to the Naib-Tehsildar, was given. This notice purported to be a prelude to action by the Magistrate concerned under Section 47 of the Act. Finally, a series of individual notices, dated 30th July, 1970, were issued (Annexures E-I to E-V) directing persons occupying rooms in the Metropole Hotel, its annexe, or its servants' quarters to vacate within a week from the issue of these notices failing which other action was to be taken. The validity of these notices is challenged by the petitioners. The contention on behalf of the Land Acquisition Collector is that the notices, dated 30th July, 1970, have been issued in exercise of the magisterial power which the Collector can exercise under Section 47 of the Act, and that the opposite party No. 1 was given that power by the notification dated 14th August, 1969, which has been produced before me by the learned counsel for the Land Acquisition Collector.
(3.) I may here deal with a preliminary objection which has been put forward on behalf of the contesting opposite parties. The objection is that the petitioners have no locus stand! as they have no legally enforceable right so that they cannot maintain this writ petition. It is contended that whatever rights they had as tenants came to an end when the award by the Collector, under Section 11 of the Act. was made. On the other hand, Mr. S. Malhotra appearing on behalf of the petitioners, has asserted that the petitioners have a right to continue in possession until they are evicted in accordance with the procedure provided by law so that the petitioners have a procedural right to be protected so as to be able to maintain the petition. It seems to me the question whether the petitioners have or have not the right to continue in possession until notices are given to them under some other provision of law and they are evicted by ordinary suits in a civil Court by some other prescribed procedure is a question relating to the merits of the case. If the petitioners could really make out even a right to procedural protection they would, in my opinion, be entitled to (succeed in the writ petition even if they have lost their rights as tenants. This was explained by me in Ram Gopal Gupta v. Assistant Housing Commr., AIR 1969 All 278 (FB), where it v/as observed, with regard to a mere procedural protection:--