PUSHPA DEVI Vs. KANSHI RAM NAND KISHORE

JUDGEMENT

(1.) The petitioner, Sm. Pushpa Devi, is the 'landlord', and the respondents, Messrs Kanshi Earn Nand Kiahore, the tenants of a chaubara in Solan. The tenancy is an yearly one commencing from 10th October every year, and the annual rent payable is Rs. 32-8-0.

(2.) The petitioner applied on 9-6-1950 to the Controller for the eviction of the respondents from the chaubara under Section 13, East Punjab Urban Rent Restriction Act (III of 1949), and the Controller passed an order on 30-9-1950 directing the respondents to put the petitioner in possession of the building. The order was passed on the grounds, firstly, of non-payment of rent for the Pushpa Devi vs. Kanshi Ram-Nand Kishore (26.07.1951 -HPHC) Page 2 of 3 preceding year from 10-10 1948 to 9-10-1949, and secondly, of the building being required by the petitioner for her own occupation. On an appeal by the respondent tenants, the learned District Judge, Mahaau, by his judgment and decree dated 18-12-1950 set aside the Controller's order and dismissed the petitioner's application. He did so on the findings that the respondents made an attempt to pay the rent in question but the petitioner was not prepared to accept the payment, and that the building was in fact not required by the petitioner for her own occupation.

(3.) The landlord-petitioner has now come up in revision to this Court under Article 227 of the Constitution of India, There is no doubt that since the passing of the Constitution, this Court has the jurisdiction, in exercise of its power of superintendence under Article 227 of the Constitution, to interfere with the decision of the appellate authority despite the finality given to that decision under Section 15 (4) of the said Act. Nathu Ram v. Pandit Ram Partap, 53 P. L. R. 90. The respondents, who argued the case personally, cited Brij Raj Krishna v. Shaw Bros. A.I.R. (38) 1951 S. C. 115. All that was laid down in that ruling was that the order of the Controller cannot be questioned in a civil Court, but not that a High Court cannot interfere with that order under Article 227 of the Constitution. The power is however, by its very nature to be exercised sparingly, and, so far as the present case is concerned, I see no reason whatsoever to interfere.