VIDYA SAGAR SOOD Vs. HIR SINGH LAL

JUDGEMENT

(1.) THIS petition is totally misconceived. The petitioner (here-in-after referred to as the plaintiff) filed a suit before the learned trial Court claiming that he be declared to be owner in possession of the suit land, which admittedly is part of Rekong Peo, Tehsil Kalpa, District Kinnaur, a scheduled tribe area. The plaintiff also prayed that proceedings under Section 5 of the H.P. Transfer of Land (Regulation) Act, 1968 before the Deputy Commissioner, Kinnaur be set-aside and quashed.

(2.) ADMITTEDLY, the land in question forms part of the tribal area. The plaintiff claims that he had purchased the land from Amar Chand father of defendant No.1 Hir Singh. The plaintiff admittedly does not belong to the scheduled tribes. An important question arose whether the plaintiff could have purchased land from a tribal or not. The plaintiff, no doubt, by means of amendment of the suit, has alleged that the defendant's father was not a tribal but this is a question also to be decided by the authority concerned. Alongwith the suit the plaintiff moved an application for stay of proceedings before the Deputy Commissioner. This application was allowed by the learned trial Court.

(3.) THE H.P. Transfer of Land (Regulation) Act, 1968 deals with lands held by tribes in tribal areas. It prescribes a procedure for the Deputy Commissioner to take action and appeal is provided to the Commissioner or Financial Commissioner. Section 7 of the Act clearly provides that the order made in appeal by the Commissioner/Financial Commissioner, as the case may be, shall be final. Even the final order passed in such cases cannot be subject matter of the civil suit unless it is shown that proper procedure has not been followed or that rules of natural justice have been violated. Otherwise, the only challenge would be by way of filing a writ petition under Article 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India. When the power of Court to even interfere in final order is limited, the Court should be very reluctant to grant stay. Why should proceedings before the statutory authority be stayed at the mere asking of the plaintiff?