(1.) A milk sample was collected by the Food inspector from accused Rattan Lal on 9/03/1982, after completing all formalities prescribed by the law and the Rules. One portion of the sample was sent to the Public Analyst who found milk-fat contents therein to be only 2.6% against the minimum prescribed limit of 3.5%. In other words, milk-fat was deficient by 29%. This resulted in the conviction of the accused by the learned Chief Judicial Magistrate, Bilaspur, u/S. 7 read with S. 16(1)(a)(i) of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act, 1954 (hereinafter referred to as 'the Act'). He was sentenced to undergo rigorous imprisonment for six months and to pay a fine of Rs. 1,000.00. The learned Sessions Judge, Shimla, upheld the order of conviction and sentence by his judgment dated 22/03/1985, which has been challenged before this Court by way of the present criminal revision.
(2.) After the report of the Public Analyst was received, its notice was sent to the accused who applied for the second sample collected from him to be sent to the Director of the Central Food Laboratory for analysis and report. According to the report of the Director, milk-fat contents were found to be 2.6% which are exactly the same as were found by the Public Analyst but non-fat solids were found to be 6.6% against the minimum prescribed limit of 8.5%. It may be noticed here that the Public Analyst had found non-fat solids to be 9.6% in the milk sample sent to him for analysis. On the above facts a reference was made in this case as also in another criminal revision, numbering 104 of 1986 (Mehar Chand v. State of Himachal Pradesh) for consituting a larger Bench to consider the question whether fresh written consent within the ambit of S. 20(1) of the Act was required after the receipt of the report made by the Director of the Central Food Laboratory for continuing the trial against the accused.
(3.) The matter was ultimately listed before a Full Bench of this Court which framed the question for decision as follows : "Can the Court proceed with a case in which it had taken cognizance of the offence on the basis of a complaint instituted with a valid written consent u/S. 20(1) of the Act in respect of a sample of food found to be adulterated by the Public Analyst for certain reasons, without there being a fresh written consent, in regard to the nature of adulteration, later found in the sample by the Director of Central Food Laboratory, which is different from that found earlier by the Public Analyst. The above question was answered by the Full Bench by its judgment pronounced on 16/08/1989. This judgment has been reported in Rattan Lal v. State (1990) 1 Shimla LC 126 and also forms part of the file of this case. Its ratio leaves no scope for doubt that a fresh written consent of the sanctioning authority u/S. 20 is required where the Public Analyst finds adulteration of one kind (species) and the Director, Central Food laboratory, finds adulteration of a different kind (species), it would, however, be noticed that in the present case the Public Analyst as well as the Director, Central Food Laboratory, in their respective reports, have come to the conclusion that the milk-fat contents in the sample sent to them were 2.6%. Their findings with respect to non-tat solid contents, however, differ widely inasmuch as the Public Analyst has given it as 9.6% where according to the Director, Central Food Laboratory, it is 6.6%. There has been no explanation from the side of the prosecution about such a vast difference in two parts of the sample collected at the same time from one place. The possibility of this difference being attributed to some basic difficulties in collecting the sample cannot be altogether over-ruled and this was one of the aspects which the sanctioning authority u/S. 20(1) of the Act would be required to consider before certifying the case to be fit for prosecution. To put it somewhat differently, it is clear that adulteration pertaining to deficiency in milk-fat is of same species but even then the vast difference in non-fat solids could have a bearing on over all suitability of the case for being sent to a court of law for prosecution of the accused. In such a case, therefore, it was incumbent on the prosecution to have obtained fresh written consent before proceeding with the case in the court of law.