JAISHI RAM Vs. SALIG RAM

JUDGEMENT

(1.) The petitioners have assailed the order, passed by Shri Shamsher Singh, Sub -Judge 1st Class, Sarkaghat, dated 30 -6 -1980. In this order; the Sub -Judge has held that the respondent is entitled to the police assistance to prevent the -present petitioners from interfering with his possession over the suit land.

(2.) It is not disputed by the petitioners that an injunction order was issued against them restraining them from interfering with the possession of the respondent. The only point which has been canvassed before me in this revision petition is, that the Sub -Judge had no jurisdiction to make an order providing police assistance to prevent the petitioners from interfering with the possession of the respondent over the land It is contended by the learned counsel that in the face of a specific provision as contained in rule 2 (a) of Order 39 of the Code of Civil Procedure regarding the consequences of disobedience or breach of injunction, the Sub -Judge could not exercise his inherent powers under Section 151 of the Code of Civil Procedure and made an order for providing police assistance to enforce such an order of injunction. It is further contended that it is an established principle of law that inherent powers can be exercised only when powers expressly conferred are exhausted. There is no dispute about this proposition of law. The question, however, which arises for consideration is whether under the facts and circumstances of the case, the learned Sub -Judge was competent to pass such an order,

(3.) I have perused the order passed by the Sub -Judge. He has based his judgment on a decision in Ravapati Audemma v. Pothineni Narasimham, [AIR 1971 A. P. 53]. This is a Division Bench judgment of that High Court. In the said judgment the point involved was the same as in the present case. The learned Judges have discussed the case -law on the point. They have not agreed with certain prior decisions. The relevant observations may be reproduced: "The observations in the aforesaid decision no doubt support the contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner. The learned Judge Bhima Sankaram, J., referred to Section 151, C. P. C. but took the view that because an order of injunction is capable of enforcement by punishing its disobedience in the manner pro vided by Order 39, Rule 2 (3), C. P. C, it is not open to the Civil Courts to enforce the same with the aid of the police. With great respect we are unable to agree with this reasoning. It has to be noticed that Order 39, Rule 2 (3), C. P. C, provides only for punishment by attachment of the property or by detention in civil prison of the person who committed breach. But it does not further provide for implementation of the order of injunction itself. Order 39, Rule 2 (3) cannot be said to be an express provision with respect to implementation of the order of injunction, but is only a provision which provides penalty for disobedience of the order. In such a case there being no other express provisions in the Code for enforcement of the order, it is not only proper but also necessary that the Courts should render all aid to the aggrieved party to derive full benefits of the order. Though the order of injunction under Order 39, C. P. C. is only in r term in nature, still it clothes the person who obtained the order with certain rights and he is entitled to enforce the aforesaid right against the party who is bound by the order. No doubt in such a case, the aggrieved party himself could approach the police authorities to prevent obstruction to the enforcement of the order or to the exercise of the right which he derives under the order of Court. But we do not see why when the same person brings to the notice of the court that enforcement of the order is sought to be prevented or obstructed, the court should not exercise its inherent power under Section 151, C. P. C. and direct the police authorities to render all aid to the aggrieved party in the implementation of the Courts order. It our opinion the exercise of such power is necessary for the ends of justice or to prevent abuse of the process and the civil court has ample jurisdiction to pass such order under Sec. 151, C. P. C. The learned Judges observation "that the police are not bound to obey any directions of the court in the absence of any statutory obligation to do so and a civil court would be stultifying itself by giving directions which may not be complied with", with great respect, cannot be said to be correct. Inasmuch as we are of the opinion that such a direction to the police authorities could be given under the inherent powers of the court under Section 151, C. P. C. the police are bound to obey such directions." The learned Judges have also referred to some decisions on the point, including the observations in Padam Sen v. State of U. P. [AIR 1961 SC 218]. It is desirable to reproduce the same : "The following observations in AIR 1961 SC 218 are also apposite in this context : The inherent powers of the Court are in addition to the powers specifically conferred on the Court by the Code. They are complementary to those powers and therefore it must be held that the Court is free to exercise them for the purpose mentioned in Sec. 151 of the Code when the exercise of those powers is not in any way in conflict with what has been expressly provided in the Code or against the intentions of the Legislature. - In view of these clear observations of their Lordships with regard to the scope and ambit of the inherent powers of the court under Section 151, C. P. C, we are clearly of the opinion that in order to do justice between the parties or to prevent the abuse of process of the court, the civil courts have ample jurisdiction to give directions to the police authorities to render aid to the aggrieved parties with regard to the implementation of the orders of Court or the exercise of the rights created under orders of court. That the police authorities owe a legal duty to the public to enforce the law is clear from a decision of the Court of Appeal, reported in R. v. Metropolitan0Police Commr., [ (1968) 1 All ER 763], where Lord Denning, M.R. observed at page 769 as follows : "I hold it to be the duty of the Commissioner of Police, as it is of every chief constable to enforce the law of the land but in all these things he is not the servant of anyone, save of the law itself. The responsibility for law enforcement lies on him. He is answerable to the law and to the law alone. - The same view was expressed by the other learned Judges. We may also refer to the judgment of the Madras High Court, in Varada -chariar v. Commr. of Police,[(1969) 2 Mad. LJ 1] where the learned Judge, Kailasam, J., after referring to the English case cited above held that the Commissioner of Police should proceed and act in accordance with the directions indicated in the aforesaid judgment."