BEG RAM Vs. CHARAN DAS

JUDGEMENT

(1.) This is a plaintiffs' application in revision under para. 35 (1) (a), Himachal Beg Ram and Anr. vs. Charan Das and Ors. (03.10.1950 -HPHC) Page 2 of 6 Pra-desh (Courts) Order, 1948. They sued the defendants in the Court of the Senior Subordinate Judge at Kasumpti for possession of a certain immovable property as nearest reversioners to the estate of the last maleholder of that property. For the determination of the Question whether the plaintiffs were such reversioners, they had to prove a pedigree, and they filed in that connection a certified copy, EX. Y, of an entry in a register. The learned Subordinate Judge by an order dated 16-5-1949 rejected this document holding on the authority of Basant Singh v. Brij Raj Saran, A.I.R. (22) 1935 P. C. 132 : (57 ALL 494) and on an interpretation of Section 90, Evidence Act, that the document, being a copy of a copy, was not admisaible in evidence. It is against this order that the plaintiffs have come up in revision.

(2.) Two preliminary objections have been taken on behalf of the defendants- respondents: (1) that the application is barred by time, and (2) that no revision against the aforesaid order lies.

(3.) On the question of limitation it appears that, allowing for the time taken in obtaining a copy of the order in question, there was a delay of seven days in filing the present application. There was a delay, that is to say, if ninety days from the date of the order be taken as the period of limitation for filing an application in revision. Applications in revision are not governed by any law of limitation, so that it has been held in some cases, for example, in Chandra Pratap v. Bindeshwari Prasad, A.I..R. (29) 1942 Oudh 340 : (200 I. C. S59) that) the proper Article applicable is Article 181, Limitation Act, which prescribes a period of three year. On the other hand, it is the practice of certain High Courts not to entertain petitions in revision filed beyond ninety days. That is the practice in the High Court at Patna (vide Krishnadevanand v. Kapildeo, A.I.R. (29) 1942 Pat. 251: (21 Pat. 197) and in the Rangoon High Court (vide Daw Po v. U Po Hmyin, A.I.R. (27) 1940 Rang. 91 : (1940 Rang. L. R. 237). Even in Oudh it was held in a later ruling of the same year, that is, in Kallu Mal v. Nawabganj Municipality, A.I.R. (29) 1942 Oudh 392 : (200 I. C. 608) that ordinarily if an application is filed beyond the period prescribed for an appeal (ninety days) it ought to be considered to have been unduly delayed, This Court came into being only about two years ago (on 15-8-1948 to be exact), so that, I agree with the learned counsel for the plaintiff-applicants, it could not be said that any such practice had grown up here. No ruling of this Court was cited by the learned counsel for the defendants respondents that the ninety-days rule was applied in the case of any revision. On the principles, however, that the interests of the State require that a period should be put to litigation (Interest reipublicae ut sit finislitium), and that a party who is not prompt in asserting his claim does not deserve the aid of the State in enforcing it (Vigilantibus, non dormientibus jura subveniunt) it is necessary that the exercise of every right should be subject to a period of limitation. A right of revision, though more limited in scope than a right of appeal, is nonetheless a right, so that, if no period of limitation is specifically prescribed therefore in the Limitation Act it is expedient that the ninety-days rule of limitation in the case of an appeal should also be adopted in the case of a revision. It may be taken in future that this practice will be followed in this Court as well. Considering that there was nothing to lead the present applicants to the conclusion that that was the practice obtaining in this Court, I would not throw out this application as time Beg Ram and Anr. vs. Charan Das and Ors. (03.10.1950 -HPHC) Page 3 of 6 barred because it was filed with a delay of seven days. Seven days is not such a long period that the applicants might be deemed to have been guilty of laches. The first objection on the ground of limitation, therefore, fails.