BHOPAL SINGH Vs. CHATTER SINGH

JUDGEMENT

(1.) Chattar Singh along with 36 others plaintiffs brought a suit for permanent prohibitory and mandatory injunction against Bhopal Singh and others including Municipality, Karnal through its President. Along with the suit they filed an application under Order 39, Rules 1 and 2, CPC which was allowed by the learned Civil Judge (Junior Division), Karnal vide his order dated 5-4-1999. The application was allowed and defendants were restrained from carrying on work of shoe manufacturing unit till they are granted licence or permission by the competent authority i.e. defendant itself-Municipality, Karnal, in the suit. This order of the learned trial Court was unsuccessfully assailed in appeal by the defendants in the suit. The learned Additional District Judge, Karnal, vide his order dated 28-5-1999 found no merit in the appeal and dismissed the same with costs. Aggrieved from the said order the defendants in the suit (petitioners herein) have preferred the present revision before this Court.

(2.) The main contention raised on behalf of the petitioners is that the Sub-Divisional Magistrate in the proceedings under Section 133 of the Criminal Procedure Code had found as a matter of fact by site inspection that no nuisance was being created by the petitioners and as such had dropped the proceedings. It is further argued that on these premises alone the learned Courts below have fell in error of jurisdiction in granting the injunction prayed for to the respondents. Learned counsel for the petitioners stated that nothing like manufacturing activity was being carried out in the premises except stitching, tailoring and use of small hammer for providing iron cover to the holes in the shoes for tying laces. He also submitted that no permission is called for from any authority.

(3.) While rebutting these arguments, learned counsel for the respondents contended that the petitioners ought to seek permission from the Municipality under Section 129 of the Haryana Municipal Act, and the bye-laws framed thereunder. Without seeking such a permission the respondents, in law, much less in equity, can be permitted to carry on any commercial activity. It is the statement on behalf of the respondents that the plaintiffs by their own conduct are estopped from running a factory or commercial activity in the premises in dispute.