SANTOKH SINGH Vs. BALBIR SINGH

JUDGEMENT

(1.) The petitioners are aggrieved against the order dated 4.10.1999 passed by the Additional Civil Judge (Senior Division) Sultanpur Lodhi, in execution proceedings whereby objection-petitioner filed by the petitioners was dismissed.

(2.) The decree holders had filed two separate suits of specific performance of agreements of sale purported to have been executed by Bhag Singh, predecessor-in-interest of Dalip Singh, Nirmal Singh and Sardul Singh sons of Jarnail Singh, against Dalip Singh, Nirmal Singh and Sardul Singh, were decreed in their favour by the Court. The appeals preferred by Nirmal Singh and Sardul Singh were also dismissed by the lower appellate Court. Against the judgments and decrees passed by the lower appellate Court, Nirmal Singh and Sardul Singh preferred Regular Second Appeals in this Court. The Regular Second Appeals were disposed of in terms of compromise entered into between the parties. The petitioner-objectors purchased the suit land from Dalip Singh, Sardul Singh and Nirmal Singh vide sale deeds dated 8.10.1987, 21.4.1989 and 30.1.1997. The contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner-objectors is that they are bona fide purchasers for consideration without notice of the pendency of the civil suits between the vendor -judgment debtors and decree holders and that, therefore, the principle of lis pendence will not apply in the present case. He further stated that the executing Court was not justified in holding that the sale deeds executed by the judgment-debtors in favour of the objectors are, undoubtedly, hit by the doctrine of lis pendence. I do not find any force in this submission of the learned counsel for the petitioners. Admittedly, the petitioner-objectors had purchased the suit land from Dalip Singh, Sardul Singh and Nirmal Singh while civil suit Nos. 94 of 19.2.1986 and 102 of 25.2.1986 were pending and the vendor-judgment debtors were a party in those suits. In these circumstances, I do not find any fault with the observation of the executing Court that the doctrine of lis pendence will apply in this case. Doctrine of lis pendence is based not on the doctrine of notice but on the doctrine of expediency. The petitioner-objectors are seeking stalling of executing proceedings till the decision of civil titled as Santokh Singh v. Balbir Singh filed by them against the decree holders on the ground that they are owners in possession of the suit land on the basis of above-said sale deeds executed in their favour by the vendor-judgment debtors. But the rights of objector-petitioners being subservient to the rights of their vendors i.e. judgment-debtors, they (petitioners) have absolutely no cause to stall the execution proceedings.

(3.) Relying upon the ratio of Brahmdeo Choudhary v. Rishikesh Prasad Jaiswal and Anr., J.T. 1997(1) S.C. 641, the learned counsel for the petitioners argued that where resistance is offered to the execution of a decree by a stranger occupying decretal property to his own right, the right of stranger has to be decided by the executing Court after giving opportunity of hearing to the stranger and the decree holder. However, the facts of the present case are quite distinguishable. However, the case of Brahmdeo Choudhary (supra) has no applicability to the facts of the present case. The executing Court, before passing the impugned order, had considered the objection-petition filed by the petitioners and the, objection-petition was dismissed by the executing Court after getting reply to the objection-petition from the decree holders and after hearing the learned counsel for the parties. I do not find any illegality or material irregularity in the impugned order which may warrant exercise of revisional jurisdiction of this Court under section 115 of the Code.