(1.) THIS order will dispose of eight revision petitions 1487 to 1489 and 1530 to 1534 of 1997 filed under Art. 227 of the Constitution challenging the order of the Appellate Authority affirming that of the Prescribed Authority under the Payment of Wages Act, 1936 (for short the Act) in which common questions of law and fact arise. Since the main arguments were addressed in Civil Revision 1487 of 1997, the facts are being taken from this case.
(2.) AJIT Singh respondent is working as conductor with Punjab Roadways, Hoshiarpur. He was served with a show cause notice alleging that he did not issue tickets to the passengers after receiving the fare from them. He gave his reply controverting the allegations and the same was not found satisfactory by the General Manager. By an order dated 20-1-1982 the General Manager, Punjab Roadways, stopped his two annual increments with cumulative effect. It may be mentioned that till the decision of the Supreme Court in Kulwant Singh Gill v. State of Punjab, 1991 (1) RSJ 413, stoppage of increments with or without cumulative effect was regarded as a minor punishment within the meaning of the Punjab Civil Services (Punishment and Appeal) Rules, 1970 (for short the Rules) and a regular departmental inquiry was not required to be held for imposing such a penalty. The Supreme Court held that stoppage of increments with cumulative effect was major punishment and a regular inquiry had to be conducted in accordance with Rules 8 and 9 of the Rules before imposing such a penalty. After the decision of the Supreme Court in Kulwant Singh Gill's case (supra) the respondent moved an application under S. 15 (2) of the Act before the Prescribed Authority alleging that contrary to the provisions of the Act his salary had been reduced by Rs. 30/-per month on the basis of the order dated 20-1-1982 imposing a penalty of stoppage of two annual increments with cumulative effect. The prayer made in the application was that the order dated 20-1-1982 be declared void and illegal and the employer directed to refund the amount illegally deducted from his salary since 20-1-1982. On receipt of notice from the Prescribed Authority, the General Manager contested the application on the plea that the Authority had no jurisdiction to entertain the application and examine the validity of the order dated 20-1-1982 punishing the respondent. It was also pleaded that the application was barred by time since the order stopping the increments had been passed on 20-1-1982 whereas the application was filed on 26-9-1991 after a lapse of more than nine years. The Prescribed Authority relying on the judgment of the Supreme Court in Kulwant Singh Gill's case (1991 (1) RSJ 413) (supra) took the view that stoppage of increments of an employee with cumulative effect was a major punishment and the same could not be imposed summarily without holding a regular enquiry in accordance with the procedure prescribed for imposing such a penalty. The order was held to be void and illegal because the respondent had been served only with a show cause notice and no departmental enquiry had been held. As regards the plea of limitation, it was held that the order dated 20-1-1982 caused a recurring loss to the applicant-respondent and that he could apply within twelve months from the date on which the deduction from his wages had been made and, therefore, the application was held to be within time. The application was allowed and the General Manager directed to refund the deductions made by him from the salary of the respondent for a period of twelve months preceding the date of the application. A further direction was given not to make deductions from the salary of the respondent in future on the basis of the aforesaid order. Feeling aggrieved by the order of the Prescribed Authority, the General Manager filed an appeal before the District Judge, Hoshiarpur who by his order dated 26-2-1994 dismissed the same. Hence the present petition.
(3.) THE learned Assistant Advocate General strenuously contended that the Prescribed Authority under the Act could not examine the validity of the order of punishment passed by the Punishing Authority and, therefore, its order and also the appellate order affirming the same are without jurisdiction and that the application filed by the respondent deserves to be dismissed. He relied on an order passed by the Supreme Court in State of Punjab v. Baldev Singh, Conductor (1998) 9 SCC 325. Learned counsel for the respondent, on the other hand, urged that the procedure prescribed for imposing a major punishment was not followed by the General Manager and, therefore, the order dated 20-1-1982 was null and void and any deduction made on its basis would be unauthorised within the meaning of the Act and that the respondent was justified in applying to the Prescribed Authority for its refund. He referred to Explanation II to S. 7 (1) of the Act to contend that since the prescribed procedure was not followed the penalty imposed could not be said to be for 'good and sufficient cause' and, therefore, an unauthorised deduction shall be deemed to have been made from his wages. Reliance in this regard has been placed on a single Bench judgment of this Court in General Manager, Punjab Roadways, Jalandhar v. Nanak Singh Driver (1987) 4 Serv LR 750.