MEERA COMPUTERS Vs. STATE OF HARYANA

JUDGEMENT

(1.) The Assessing Authority-cum-Excise and Taxation Officer, Gurgaon, passed an order dated March 26, 1993 by which the petitioner's turnover for the assessment year 1989-90 was fixed at Rs. 2,10,00,000. As a result, an additional demand was created. The petitioner filed an appeal which was allowed by the Joint Excise and Taxation Commissioner, Faridabad. Vide order dated September 22, 1993 the additional demand of Rs. 9,96,850 was reduced to Rs. 19,476. The Revisional Authority, viz., the Additional Excise and Taxation Commissioner, Haryana, invoked its powers under section 9(2) of the Central Sales Tax Act, read with section 40 of the Haryana General Sales Tax Act, 1973. It found that the order dated September 22, 1993 was wholly without jurisdiction as District Gurgaon had been placed under the charge of the Appellate Authority at Rohtak instead of Faridabad. Aggrieved by this order, the petitioner filed an appeal. The order of the Revisional Authority having been confirmed by the Tribunal, the assessee has filed the present writ petition. Copies of the orders passed by the Revisional Authority and the Tribunal have been produced as annexures P-2 and P-4 respectively. The petitioner prays that these orders be quashed.

(2.) The respondents have filed a detailed written statement. It has been averred that vide order dated September 9, 1993 passed by the Excise and Taxation Commissioner, Haryana, the appellate jurisdiction in respect of District Gurgaon had been conferred on the Appellate Authority, Rohtak. Consequently, the order passed by the Appellate Authority on September 22, 1993 was wholly without jurisdiction.

(3.) Mr. Sawhney, appearing for the petitioner, has contended that the provisions of section 40 of the Act, could not have been invoked in the circumstances of the present case. Secondly, it has been argued that the order dated September 9, 1993 had not been communicated to the Appellate Authority and that it could not be said that the order was without jurisdiction. Still further, the learned counsel has contended that the Revisional Authority had taken into consideration two facts, viz., the issue of order dated September 9, 1993 and also that only the stay application was fixed for hearing on September 22, 1993. It has been contended that in fact the stay order has been passed on July 10, 1993 and thus the Revisional Authority had proceeded on a wrong assumption of facts. Lastly, learned counsel has submitted that the Tribunal even failed to consider the submission made by the petitioner in this behalf. He has also relied upon certain decisions to which reference shall be made at the appropriate stage.