SHER SINGH Vs. STATE OF HARYANA

JUDGEMENT

(1.) SHER Singh petitioner has filed the present petition under Section 482 Cr.P.C. read with Articles 226/227 of the Constitution of India seeking his premature release on the basis of instructions dated 4.2.1993 as amended by the instructions dated 17.7.1997.

(2.) THE facts of the case can be noticed in the following manner :- Sher Singh was arrested in a case under Section 302 IPC vide FIR No. 215 dated 19.9.1998 for committing the murder of a woman. He was taken into custody on 23.9.1988 and remained as undertrial upto 3.2.1989. He was convicted and sentenced on 4.2.1989. The case set up by the petitioner is that as per instructions dated 4.2.1993 he was supposed to undergo 10 years actual and 14 years with remission and this sentence he has completed on 4.2.1999 itself. The contention of the petitioner is that as per the policy dated 4.2.1993 it is the responsibility of the State Government/Superintendent, Central Jail to submit the cases of the life convicts two months before they complete the sentence along with their comments to the Addl. Director General/Inspector General of Prisons, Haryana, who will put up all such cases along with his recommendations for consideration before the State level committee and the State level committee shall consider each case on merits whether a person is entitled to premature release or not.

(3.) UNDER these circumstances the point for consideration before this court is whether the vested right can be divested by the subsequent instructions/policy issued by the State Government or not. In the considered opinion of this Court, and in view of the guidelines framed by the State itself on 4.2.1993 such vested right of the petitioner to be considered for premature release on completion of ten years actual and 14 years with remissions cannot be divested by the State Govt. The position of the petitioner would have been different if he had completed ten years subsequent to the instructions dated 16.3.1999 and in that eventuality the petitioner perhaps had no case. But here is a case where the cause of action right had already accrued to the petitioner. It had matured into a vested right which cannot be divested by the instructions dated 16.3.1999.