JOGINDER SINGH Vs. MANJIT KAUR

JUDGEMENT

(1.) The scope of exercise of judicial discretion to achieve the ends of justice, in furtherance to the provisions of Code of Civil Procedure is the basic question that deserves consideration in the present case.

(2.) Adopting of derivative approach with some clarity would suffice to elucidate the point in controversy. Learned counsel appearing for the petitioners while impugning the order dated 9.12.1998 in this revision contended that in the interest of justice, the learned trial Court ought to have granted another opportunity to lead evidence and ought not have passed the order closing the evidence of the plaintiffs. In order to barely examine the merit of this contention, reference to the impugned order would be appropriate.

(3.) Should such discretion by the Court can ever be termed as "uncontrolled and un-guided exercise of judicial discretion by the Court " I have no hesitation in answering the above question in the negative. Certainly, it is not possible for the Court to provide the panacea to all problems arising at different stages of the suit. The Code of Civil Procedure is a comprehensive code and the different stages of a suit are controlled and regulated by various checks and limitations provided in the Code. The pious wish of the legislation for expeditious disposal of the suit runs like a golden thread in the various provisions of the Code. The inherent powers vested in the Court under section 151 of the C.P.C. are of very wide magnitude, but are certainly controlled by self restraints and restrict exercise of such powers depending on merit of each case. The Court is under an implied obligation to balance the equities between the parties to a suit to achieve the ends of justice, which is the basic paramount object of the Code. The equities would demand that power under the provisions of the Code or the inherent powers should be exercised by the Court to correct imbalances or inequities resulting from unnecessary adjournments, between the parties. As a result of fault of one party to the suit, the other is certainly put to inconvenience or unnecessary harassment. Delay in conclusion, of "proceedings again is a factor of vital importance, as such, uncontrolled opportunity to a party to conclude its evidence in any number of opportunities would certainly prejudice the interest of the other party to the suit, who is exposed to prolong litigation and expense. Thus, there has to be a stage when the Court must decline to grant further opportunity to the defaulting party to conclude its evidence.