PANIPAT CO-OPERATIVE SUGAR MILLS LTD Vs. HARYANA STATE BOARD FOR THE PREVENTION AND CONTROL OF WATER POLLUTION

JUDGEMENT

(1.) THE short but common question of some significance involved in these five writ petitions Nos. 2122, 2635, 8591 and 8231 of 1989 and 7139 of 1987, is as to whether the sugar/alcohol industry is covered by entry No. 15 of Schedule I to Central Act No. 36 of 1977, i. e. , Water (Prevention and Control of Pollution) Cess Act, 1977. In view of the pristinely legal nature of the question it is hardly necessary to advert to any facts except to record that the petitioners manufacture sugar/molasses from sugarcane. All that is necessary to notice is the relevant provisions of the statute which are as follows :-" 3. Levy and collection of Cess. (1) There shall be levied and collected a cess for the purposes of the Water (Prevention and Control of Pollution) Act, 1974 (6 of 1974) and utilisation thereunder. (2) The cess under Sub-section (1) shall be payable by (a) every person carrying on any specified industry; and XX XX XX Specified industry' is defined as per section 2 (c) to mean :-"any industry specified in Schedule I" Entry NO. 15 of this Schedule reads :- "processing of animal or vegetable products industry. "

(2.) THOUGH my straight and forthright answer to the question posed above is that sugar industry is covered by this entry, yet it is urged by Mr. Batta. learned counsel for the petitioners in the light of the Supreme Court judgments in Ramavtar Budhaiprasad etc v. Assistant Sales Tax Officer. Akola and Anr, A. I. R. 1961 S. C. 1325 M/s. Motipur Zamindary Co {private) Ltd. v. State of Bihar A. I. R. 1962 S. C. 660, 4. A. I. R. , Mangulu Sahu Romghari Sahu v. Sales Tax Officer, Ganjam, A. I. R. 1974 S. C. 390 and State of West Bengal and Ors. v. Washi Ahmed etc, A. I. R. 1977 S. C. 1638 that sugarcane by no stretch of imagination can be held to be "vegstable". He may be right and in fact he is that sugarcane is not "vegetable", but does it mean that it is not even a vegetable product ? Herein we are concerned with vegetable products industry and not vegetable industry. The "vegetable products" essentially mean what belongs to the plant kingdom as opposed to the animal kingdom. In other words, the word "vegetable" has been used in contradiction to the "animal". As per Webster's Third New International Disctionary, the word "vegetable" means anything living or growing in the manner of simple living things (as plants ). As per this dictionary, the word "animal" means any member of the group of living beings typically capable of spontaneous movement and rapid motor response to stimulation (by external or internal agents) as distinguished from a plant. . . . . . . . . As one or more of these attributes may be entirely wanting in some animals, and present in some plants, the various characters of an organism must be taken collectively into account in classing it as an animal or a plant. In the very nature of things the Parliament could not specifically and separately, mention each and every industry which leads to pollution of water. It had essentially to resort to and has specified, if I may say so, only the species or types of industries whose activities normally lead to pollution of water The fallacy in Mr. Batta's argument is that he wants to read the word 'vegetable' disjunctively, i. e. , in isolation and without reference to products. As a matter of fact it has to be read in conjunction with that word. The elementary principle of interpretation of statutes is that no word occurring therein has to be ignored or obliterated. The entry is not processing of animal or vegetable industry. Can these be called industries at all ? The word "products" gives a definite colour and meaning to the word "vegetable" meaning thereby all that belongs to the world of plants. The age-old classification of living thing into animal kingdom and vegetable/plant kingdom is well known. In the light of this analysis of mine, the above noted judgments of the Supreme Court are of no help to Mr Batta. it is not his case that sugarcane is not a plant even, A Divison Bench of the Allahbad High Court in Kishan Sakari Chini Mills Ltd. v. State of Uttar Pradesh and Ors. ,5 while interpreting this entry has recorded a similar conclusion but for different reasons.

(3.) AT one stage it was sought to be urged by Mr Batta that though sugar is manufactured from sugarcane, yet there being a difference in the meaning and connotation of manufacturing and processing, the petitioner mills would not be ccered by this entry. I, however, see no merit in this submission of the learned counsel as to my mind, manufacturing is also one of the processes of producing sugar. It is more so in the context in which the word "processing'' has been used in this entry.